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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this research was to determine both the added operating and support 
(O&S) costs and affordability of operating and maintaining a future naval battle force of 
324 ships as proposed in the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan.  Cost estimation including 
regression, 3-year moving averages, point, expert and analogous modeling was used to 
capture both historical and future O&S costs from FY1991 to FY2024.   
With an emphasis on the three main cost drivers, (manpower, fuel and 
maintenance) which arguably had the largest influence on ships’ O&S costs, data were 
obtained from the Visibility & Management of Operating & Support Cost (VAMOSC) 
database and various Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs).  Analysis and modeling 
followed suite in order to forecast expected future costs and affordability for a proposed 
12.5 percent growth in naval fleet size by FY2024. 
Reviewing all 29 classes of ship within the expected FY2024 battle force, 
normalized results from the cost estimation models yielded a minimum cost growth of 17 
percent in O&S costs.  Even if budget growth trend rates were to remain steady, negating 
the possibility of budget decreases, this thesis argues the Navy would still not be able to 
afford its proposed future battle force in FY2024.     
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“In the past we spent so much effort in areas of research, development 
and acquisition, because they were tied to the budgets we were receiving, that 
people didn’t ask too many questions in the area of operations and support.”  
Ron Rosenthal1 
Prior to 2011, the Navy had been required to submit annually to Congress its 30-
year shipbuilding plan.  In the plan, it laid out an expected timeline for the construction of 
new naval ships developed and procured over the next three decades in order to maintain 
the fleet as older ships transition to retirement.  Within its FY2003 shipbuilding plan, the 
Navy announced to Congress its goal to grow and maintain a naval battle force fleet of 
375 ships.2  In FY2006, that plan changed to the more publicized and familiar 313-ship 
Navy goal.  According to Secretary of the Navy, Ray Mabus, and what is also suggested 
in the Navy’s FY11/12 Shipbuilding Construction (SCN) budgets, that goal has since 
increased to approximately 324 ships.3  These numbers are provided and updated 
annually by the Navy in order to tailor its perceived future needs of the fleet and thereby 
successfully support its strategic missions against a continuously evolving world 
environment.  As result, the size of the fleet has changed and is continuously changing, 
with this latest shipbuilding plan finally showing signs of intent to reverse the downward 
trend over the last 23 years from 568 to 288 ships shown in Figure 1 to the upward trend 
of 324 ships depicted in Figure 2 before dropping back down.    
                                                 
1 From article on GovernmentExecutive.com titled, “Price Check” written by Katherine McIntire 
Peters on 01AUG2998. 
2 See Table 1 for the breakdown of the Navy’s battle force. 
3 SECNAV Mabus provided a 324 ship shipbuilding goal during a Secretary of the Navy Guest 





Figure 1.   Past-Present U.S. Naval Ship Inventory Levels (From: 4) 
 
Figure 2.   Present-Future U.S. Naval Ship Inventory Levels (From: 5) 
Although the legal requirement for the Navy has since changed to provide only a 
10 year shipbuilding plan that is now submitted to Congress by request, the contents of 
what is provided in the report remain the same.  That is to say, the report details the 
expected number of ships and projected costs to develop and procure them each year out 
for the next three decades.6  The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and Congressional 
                                                 
4 Numbers derived from the Ronald O’Rourke‘s CRS report titled, “Navy Force Structure and 
Shipbuilding Plan: Background and Issues for Congress.” 
5 Numbers derived from the Navy’s FY2011 Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for 
Construction of Naval Vessels. 




Research Service (CRS) usually provide their own independent analyses of this report to 
determine the affordability and validity of the Navy’s goal as well as their own 
recommendations to meet it.  The affordability aspect is focused on the research and 
development (R&D) costs as well as the procurement costs associated with these new 
ships.  The validity aspect takes into account the added expectations of ship 
commissioning and decommissioning timeline alignments to the schedule dictated in the 
plan to reach the desired number of ships operating in the fleet each year.  In the latest 
CBO and CRS shipbuilding plan analysis reports provided on June 2010 and April 2011 
respectively, their collective conclusions were that the Navy has underestimated the costs 
of adding the suggested 276 ships to the fleet over the next 30 years as well as the 
validity of reaching and/or maintaining the desired level.7  What all three of these reports 
fail to mention are the projected operating and support (O&S) costs/affordability 
associated with the Navy’s goal of adding these ships to the fleet and the budget.   
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
When estimating the costs and affordability of a new ship within the shipbuilding 
plan, the total expected costs to be incurred over the lifecycle of that ship must be 
considered so as to not further understate the budgetary requirements of these ventures.  
The four cost areas within a lifecycle cost are categorized as: 
• Research and Development (R&D) 
• Procurement (otherwise known as Investment) 
• Operating and Support (O&S) 
• Disposal 
As seen in a typical life cycle cost structure for a ship, Figure 3 clearly shows that 
O&S costs make up the majority of the lifecycle costs overshadowing the other three.  In 
                                                 





fact, those costs usually comprise 70–80 percent of the total lifecycle costs.8  A 
breakdown of these O&S categories is located in Table 26 of Appendix A.  
 
Figure 3.   The Four Areas of a Lifecycle (From: 9)   
Since these particular costs make up the bulk of a ship’s lifecycle costs and 
therefore consume a higher percentage of the Navy’s budget, it is imperative to know 
what these cost estimates are; that they be included in future shipbuilding plans; and that 
an affordability analysis be conducted to determine the validity of the shipbuilding goal.  
This is especially true because as Vice Admiral McCoy acknowledged in the Washington 
Times, “the current defense budget does not provide what the Navy needs.”10  As cost 
drivers such as manpower, fuel and/or maintenance continue to drive O&S costs upward 
and strain the Navy’s Operation and Maintenance (OMN) and Military Personnel (MPN) 
budgets each year, knowing what these future costs will be will lead to less of a 
likelihood of future negligence in both budgetary planning and execution as more ships 
are added to the mix. 
C. OBJECTIVE   
The intent of this thesis is first to determine the specific makeup of the 324 ship 
battle force fleet in FY2024.  Secondly, to estimate the expected future operating and 
                                                 
8 Marion Eggenberger - Navy’s Acquisition Logistics and Total Ownership Cost Branch Head. 
9 Source:  Defense Acquisition Guidebook dated 18March2011. 
10 From Washington Times article titled, “Navy Fleet Needs Funding, Forbes Says” written by 




support costs to be incurred by the Navy in order to, thirdly, determine the affordability 
of operating it.  Using mostly regression analysis to develop parametric cost estimating 
models but with some point and analogous estimates as well, a cost estimate was used to 
forecast the expected O&S costs likely to be incurred by the Navy.  Those expected costs 
were used to determine whether or not the announced 12.5 percent growth in the Navy 
fleet could realistically be afforded based on current and implied future initiatives.11 
D. ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER 
Chapter II of this paper provides a literature review and model testing of previous 
cost estimating research in the field of O&S costs for the Navy.  Chapter III describes the 
data and three-part methodology used to construct the parametric cost models and 
analyze the projected costs and affordability in FY2024.  Chapters IV and V are 
comprised of the data analysis of the cost estimating and affordability respectively, 
followed by Chapter VI’s conclusion and pertinent appendixes. 
                                                 








II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND TESTING OF PAST MODELS  
There have been several research studies completed in the past which have 
focused on operating and support costs of the Navy but none have gone so far as to 
measure the future O&S costs 10–20 years from the present in order to determine 
whether or not such costs could be afforded.  A few thesis research studies listed below 
centered their attention on the determination and identification of cost relationships 
among the various cost factors that seemingly drive operating and support costs for the 
Navy.  Other studies narrowed their attention to more specific factors that may affect 
these O&S costs.   
A. LITERATURE REVIEW   
In Ting’s 1993 thesis entitled, “Estimating Operating and Support Cost Models 
for U.S. Naval Ships,” he examined Manpower, Material, Maintenance and Overhaul 
costs derived from the Visibility & Management of Operating & Support Cost 
(VAMOSC) system in order to construct simple univariate cost models.12  In doing so, 
his research analysis concluded that cost relationships did in fact exist across the 
spectrum of cost variables, with the manpower factor having the largest impact on costs.  
Although this manpower conclusion is true when taken over the average as seen in Figure 
4 of the next section, the more current data throughout the remainder of this paper will 
show that maintenance actually overtakes the effects of manpower in driving operational 
costs in 10 of the 29 classes of ship analyzed.   
In Brandt’s 1999 thesis entitled, “A parametric Cost Model for Estimating 
Operating and Support Costs of U.S. Navy (Non-Nuclear) Surface Ships,” he too 
examined cost relationships among different independent variables using a 13 year data 
set ranging from 1984–1996.  From his regression analysis, he was able to construct three 
univariate cost estimating equations, any one of which could be used to determine the 
                                                 
12 Visibility & Management of Operating & Support Cost (VAMOSC) is a web-enabled management 





total annual operating and support costs for any given type of ship at any time with the 
exception of submarines and aircraft carriers.  The three variables he used were Ship 
Light Displacement (weight), Ship Overall Length, and Manpower.  His assumption for 
use of these variables was that annual O&S costs for any ship within a class did not 
change from year to year, not including effects of inflation.  That is to say, as long as 
these variables did not change, so too the cost would remain unchanged.  As shown in the 
next section, this assumption no longer holds validity since there are numerous variable 
cost effects that drive overall costs, such as increasing manning, fuel and maintenance 
costs, which indicate that O&S costs do in fact change from year to year. 
In Hascall’s et al. 2003 professional report entitled, “Analysis of the Ship Ops 
Model’s Accuracy in Predicting U.S. Naval Ship Operating Cost,” the premise of the 
study was to test the accuracy of the Navy’s then-current cost estimating model which did 
not encompass total operating and support costs but instead just operations and 
maintenance.13  This model consisted of the use of several elaborate Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheets which included input spreadsheets, calculation spreadsheets, summary 
spreadsheets, and informational spreadsheets; all for use in estimating the 1B1B sub-
activity budget within the larger Operation and Maintenance, Navy (OMN) budget.  Ship 
operational costs such as charter, fuel, utilities, temporary additional duty, and operating 
target (includes repair parts and consumable purchases) can all be found within this sub-
activity and three-year averages mixed with various cost factors were used to derive these 
cost estimates.  From the study’s findings, a more reliable forecasting model was 
recommended using a mixture of three-year averages or simple linear regression 
equations depending on the type of ship and its location in either the Atlantic or Pacific 
Fleet.     
In Gorman’s 2003 thesis entitled, “Effect of Optempo on Ship Operational 
Costs,” he examined the effects between operational tempo and operational costs to 
determine if a relationship actually existed.  Analysis of burn rate data and expenditures 
among several ship classes was performed to access a possible relationship, but 
                                                 




unfortunately his analysis proved inconclusive.  “There is no significant relationship 
between OPTEMPO and expenditure…not to say a relationship cannot be found.” 
(Gorman, 2003)  
B. TESTING OF PAST MODELS  
In an attempt to abstain from “reinventing the wheel” by constructing new 
parametric equations for use within this thesis analysis, a diligent effort was made to use 
the models already constructed by either Ting or Brandt.  As will be discussed, neither set 
of models was able to be successfully utilized for this thesis.  Therefore, new cost 
relationships and models were required. 
1. Ting’s Model 
Ting derived four O&S regression cost models, one for each of the Manpower, 
Material, Maintenance and Overhaul costs factors.  The results from these four were 
added to finally calculate the total O&S cost for one ship.  For example, his models for 
manpower and material were: 
MP = b0 + b1OFFNAVY + b2ENLNAVY + E 
and 
MAT = b0 + b1ln(HRSUWAY) + b2ln(BBLSPRHR) + E 
where,  
MP and MAT are manpower costs and material costs 
OFFNAVY and ENLNAVY are officer and enlisted levels  
ln(HRSUWAY) is natural logarithm of steaming hours underway 
ln(BBLSPRHR) is natural logarithm of barrels of fuel per steaming hour 
B0,1,2 are coefficients  




When applying updated VAMOSC data from 1991–2010 to these two models for 
various classes of ships, regression results continuously yielded poor Adjusted R2, 
Significance-F, and/or P-values which were below acceptable levels.14  For instance, 
depending on the class of ship, Ting’s MP equation would only yield acceptable 
regression results if the officer or enlisted variable was either completely removed or at 
least replaced with the fiscal year (FY) variable.  In almost every case, using total 
manpower instead of distinguishing between officers and enlisted as the first variable 
while also including fiscal year as the second variable, would yield an acceptable result.  
One example of an acceptable model found was:  
MP = b0 + b1TotalManning + b2FY + E. 
*No acceptable/successful results were yielded using Ting’s MAT model.   
Additional focus was also placed on Ting’s research statement that the manpower 
factor had the largest impact on costs.   Although this statement was true on average 
using more updated data, preliminary sampling has shown that about 35 percent of the 
different classes of ship assessed show that manpower was in fact not the largest impact 
during the entire life time of a ship.  As seen in Figure 4 depicting historical data for the 
average LSD-41 class of ship, by FY2009, maintenance costs overtook the effects of 
manpower in driving operational costs.15   
                                                 
14 Acceptable limits are Adjusted R2 values of .9 or higher and Significance-F and P-values of .1 or 
lower.  Adjusted R2 values answer the question of whether the regression model should be used over 
simply taking an average instead.  F-significance values answer the question of whether the regression 
model is a good model or not.  And P-values answer the question of whether or not the corresponding 
independent variables support the model. 





Figure 4.   Manning cost vs. Maintenance cost   
A more prevalent example could be seen in Figure 5 in which the data sample 
from the SSN-21 class submarine clearly showed that although manpower has larger 
effects in overall costs in the earlier years of the program, it was surpassed by 
maintenance costs in 2004 making the manning cost on average less of a cost driver than 
maintenance.16  As illustrated in Chapter IV, there were several examples of ships in 
which maintenance costs dominate O&S costs entirely. 
 
Figure 5.   Manning cost vs. Maintenance cost 
                                                 
16 SSN-21 is type of Fast Attack Nuclear Submarine. 
Manning costs are 
larger on average  
 
Manning costs are 





2. Brandt’s Model 
Brandt created three univariate cost estimation equations with which to estimate 
the total annual operating and support costs associated with any type of U.S. Navy ship.  
Each of the three equations’ single independent variable (X) represented ship light 
displacement, manpower, or ship length respectively.  These equations were: 
 Y = 111,302X.618 
 Y = 285,215X.75 
 Y = 1223X1.6 
Using the FY2010 LSD-41 Whidbey Island amphibious class ship data as a 
sample derived from VAMOSC and JANES, below are the calculations and final 
estimates in FY2010 constant dollars. 
 Y = 111,302(16,708 tons).618 = $66.4M  
 Y = 285,215(298 personnel).75 = $29.9M 
 Y = 1223(609 ft.)1.6 = $51.3M 
As seen from the outputs, the range of operating and support costs for a LSD-41 
class ship in FY2010 would be $29.9M to $66.4M depending on which variable equation 
was decided on.  The actual O&S costs recorded in VAMOSC was $82.7M which was 
176 percent higher than the lowest estimate and 24.5 percent higher than the highest 
estimate.  Based on this inadequate/outdated costing model, it was determined that a new 
model was required that employed cost estimating relationships but assumed annual costs 
did in fact change from year to year and other factors such as variable manning, fuel and 




III. DATA DESCRIPTION AND METHODOLOGY 
A. DATA DESCRIPTION 
This thesis utilized historical O&S cost data supplied by either the Visibility & 
Management of Operating & Support Costs (VAMOSC) ship database maintained by the 
Naval Center for Cost Analysis (NCCA) or from the various Selected Acquisition 
Reports (SAR) maintained by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.17  Since the bulk of this thesis relied on 
parametric cost estimations using regression analysis, most of the cost data were obtained 
from the VAMOSC system. 
Within the VAMOSC system, specific historical cost data for all classes of ship 
within the current FY2010 battle force fleet were compiled from either the “Ship” or 
“Military Sealift Command” universe/databases.  The use of either database was 
dependent on the particular class of ship reviewed.  Figure 6 illustrates the arrangement 
of the historical cost data elements into four main categories listed within the Ships 
universe.  Since this thesis will argue that most costs on a ship are a result of manning, 
fuel and/or maintenance costs, those were the key areas of focus from which cost data 
were mostly drawn.  Manning costs from section 1.1 and fuel costs under POL within 
section 1.2 were both taken from the Direct Unit Cost category.  Maintenance costs were 
also drawn from a subsection (repair parts) of section 1.2 as well as from the entire 2.0 
and 3.0 categories.  Total O&S costs for a class of ship each year were simply the sum of 
all categories listed. 
The Military Sealift Command database was divided into six categories which 
consisted of unit level manpower, unit operations, maintenance, sustaining support, 
continuing system improvements and indirect support.   
                                                 





Of note, this was the same breakdown found in the Selected Acquisition Reports used as 
point estimates on some of the ships in this thesis.  The areas from which cost data were 
drawn in this database were the first three categories mentioned.  
 
Figure 6.   Major Cost Elements under Ships Universe (From: 18) 
With the assumption that the decade from 1991–2000 would encompass a period 
of low OPTEMPO and the decade from 2001–2010 would encompass a high OPTEMPO 
for the Navy, the historical data span used in this research was 20 years ranging from 
FY1991 to FY2010 in an attempt to capture both.19  All data remained in FY2010 
constant dollars and all subsequent analysis, equations, and estimates were also in 
FY2010 constant dollars.20  
Although it was assumed that the VAMOSC database provided accurate, up-to-
date, and therefore reliable data, it is worth mentioning some discrepancies discovered in 
the reporting.  As further discussed in Chapter IV, there were a few classes of ships 
which seemed to under-report or perhaps be missing certain cost data.  For instance, the 
                                                 
18 Recreated from the VAMOSC Overview Brief. 
19 2010 is the most recent year for which complete data were available. 




surveillance ships (AGOS) had negligible manpower costs listed within their database.  
That is to say, reported costs were so little that it was as if no crew were being paid.  In 
another example, Figure 63 of APPENDIX A showed just one of a couple of classes of 
ships which had costs reports in both the Ship and Military Sealift Command databases 
but the costs reported in the two databases were very much different from each other.  
This includes significant differences in manning numbers as mentioned earlier.  Despite 
these discrepancies, the VAMOSC database as a whole was still considered a strong valid 
and reliable source for use as a historical cost retrieval system for the battle force.    
B. METHODOLOGY 
Before determining whether or not the Navy could afford a 324 ship battle force 
in FY2024, the future costs expected to be incurred from this particular size fleet were 
required to be known.  Before the costs of the fleet could be calculated, the particular 
inventory or number of ships in each class that make up the force must have been known, 
both currently and in the future.  The methodology used towards gaining all these 
answers and analysis is displayed in Figure 7.      
 





1. Assumptions & Limitations 
• VAMOSC data were up-to-date and reliable. 
• Costs did not include embarked squadrons onboard ships. 
• Manpower costs for submarines, Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) and Joint 
High Speed Vessels (JHSV) were less than true costs since they only 
captured half of the Blue-Gold crew size.21 
• Full annual O&S costs were assigned to ship inventory counts in FY2010 
and FY2024 regardless if a particular ship was commissioned or 
decommissioned sometime during that year.    
• Costs associated with all Guided Missile Frigates (FFG-7) in the active 
naval reserve were the same as those not in the reserves. 
• New ships commissioned to replace older ones as they decommission 
between FY2010–2024 retained the same cost estimates as their 
predecessors within their same class.    
• Uses of the specific cost estimation models in this thesis for each class of 
ship were the best options to use since they provided the most accurate 
solutions when tested with actual recorded costs in the past. 
• The cost estimates for the entire battle force in both FY2010 and FY2024 
were underestimates of actual costs due to most of the cost models 
yielding low estimates on average as well as due to the limitations listed 
above. 
• New factors such as energy and additional reduced manning initiatives 
were not considered when creating cost estimation models since they did 
not affect historical costs.   
                                                 
21 The Blue-Gold screw size concept is based on a rotational basis in which one crew, either Gold or 




2. Ship Inventory 
The total inventory of battle force ships and numbers of each type/class of ship 
will vary from year to year as a result of the complex relationship among procurement, 
design and construction times, commissioning/decommissioning, funding availability, 
industrial base capacity and war-fighting priorities.   
3. Cost Estimation Models 
When creating the cost models for the different classes of ships in the battle force, 
13 different independent variables were tested in various combinations in the search for 
successful cost estimating relationships (CER) that would yield statistically strong 
estimation models.  These variables were fuel cost, fuel gallons, burn rate, price-per 
gallon, fiscal year, manning cost, manning number, enlisted number, officer number, 
underway steaming hours, labor hours, age, and maintenance cost.  Of these, fuel gallons, 
burn rate, labor hours and age were eventually discarded from the equations since they 
offered no viable solutions or relationships within the regression models.   
The primary goal was to utilize parametric regression models that not only passed 
the proper statistical checkpoints but also produced strong cost estimates when tested and 
compared to actual costs incurred within each class of ship over the period of time 
reviewed.  Whenever regression models were either not feasible or not applicable, the use 
of point, analogous or three-year moving average cost estimations took their place.  Cases 
in which a lack of feasibility or applicability were present was when for instance, a class 
of ship either had too few data points to be able to develop statistically a significant 
regression equation or its data were too volatile to yield one, and cases in which no cost 
data were reported since that class of ship may not have entered the fleet yet.  
a. Regression Models 
With the goal of creating cost estimates that represented the top three cost 
drivers which were manpower costs, fuel costs and maintenance costs, a work breakdown 
structure approach was used in creating each series of regression equations (Equations 2–




each class of ship throughout Chapter IV.  As illustrated in Figure 8, by using the top 
three cost drivers as the independent variables and the overall cost as the dependent 
variable, successful regression equations were achieved to yield O&S cost estimates for 
most classes of ships.   
 
Figure 8.   Work Breakdown Structure of Regression Models 
Equation 1 was the main regression equation calculated in each class 
which would serve as the flagship for obtaining total O&S costs per ship.22  MPC 
(manpower cost), FC (fuel cost) and MC (maintenance cost) served as the independent 
variables in this equation.  In order to input the dollar values in each of these three 
independent variables, additional regression equations were then calculated within each 
of these cost areas as well.  In certain classes of ships, MPC or FC may have been 
excluded within the flagship model.   
Equation 2 is as an example of the manpower regression equation in which 
fiscal year and crew size (manning number) were used to find the manning costs for each 
class of ship.  Of note, in some cases, the breakdown of manning number into officer and 
                                                 




enlisted variables was required instead.  A three-year moving average was used to obtain 
the values for these independent valuables which then aggregated into Equation 2 to find 
MPC.  The calculated answer from this regression equation would then be aggregated 
upward, serving as the input for MPC in Equation 1.  In certain classes of ships, MPC 
may have been excluded from Equation 1 which would then mitigate the need for an 
Equation 2.  In other cases, no satisfactory regression equation was achievable for 
Equation 2 so a three-year moving average was used instead and would remain as “MPC” 
in the written/simplified equation of the analysis section.  
The same process was used for Equation 3 in which fuel costs were 
calculated.  Price per gallon of fuel and steaming hours underway served as the two 
independent variables with total fuel cost as the dependent variable.  A three-year moving 
average was used to obtain the values for the independent variables and a final FC 
solution would then be aggregated back up to Equation 1.  In certain cases, such as with 
the nuclear powered carriers and submarines, this cost area was excluded altogether since 
fuel costs were not a factor.  If no FC regression was possible for other classes of ship, a 
three-year moving average was be used in its place and would appear as “FC” in the 
simplified equation within the analysis section.       
For Equation 4, in all cases, no satisfactory regression models were able to 
be achieved for maintenance costs.  That is to say, regression equations were produced 
but due to poor statistical values such as adjusted coefficient of determination (R-
squared) values well below .9, they were discarded and three-year moving averages were 
used instead; the solutions to which were then aggregated up into Equation 1 and 
remained as “MC” within the equation.23  
b. Regression Tables 
APPENDIX B contains the correlation coefficient matrixes tables 
associated with all the satisfactory regression models used for the FY2024 battle force 
                                                 
23 R-squared (R^2) is a regression statistic which tells how reliable the measured data will fall directly 
on the best fit line.  The larger the value, the better fit and for this thesis, .9 or higher was the benchmark in 




cost estimates.  These correlation tests were completed on all independent variables used 
within each class of ship to determine how each variable affected the others.  Values of .7 
or higher or -.7 or lower were used in this thesis as the benchmark for signs of high 
correlation or in another words, strong linear relation of some kind.24  Since these tables 
were compiled data from Equations 1 through 4 of each ship class, it is worth reminding 
that although there may be several noticeable values above .7 and below -.7 in the tables, 
it did not mean they correlate with each other since they may not have been a part of the 
same equation or may have served as either a dependent or independent variable at the 
time.  For example, manning cost and fiscal year may have shown a .8 correlation but 
since manning cost was a dependent variable and fiscal year an independent variable 
within Equation 2, this value was acceptable.  If manning number on the other hand had 
the .8 value with fiscal year, this would have been an example of high correlation since 
they both were independent variables within Equation 2.       
APPENDIX C contains the compiled regression results tables from each 
of the classes of ships in which regression models were used for the FY2024 cost 
estimates.  These tables contain the F-Significance, Adjusted R-squared values and 
coefficient values for each equation.  Again, since estimates for maintenance costs did 
not rely on regression, its rows were left empty.    
c. Point Estimates and Analogous Estimates 
For ships that were so new that there was only one year’s worth of 
historical cost data, a point estimate was used as the cost estimating model.  In another 
words, the total recorded O&S cost for a particular ship during the one year it was 
measured was brought forward and used as the FY2024 cost as well.  This technique was 
also applied to the ships that have not yet been built and so relied on the single estimated 
                                                 
24 Correlation coefficient is a statistical test that outputs a number between -1 and 1 which indicates 
how strong of a relation two variables may have with each other.  A perfect relationship is with a 
correlation coefficient of -1 or 1 and a correlation coefficient of zero indicates no existence of a relationship 




O&S cost listed in their Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR).25  For future ships that had 
no SAR data, an analogous estimate was used based on similar platforms of which cost 
data were available, either historically via VAMOSC or through expert testimony.     
4. Affordability 
Affordability analysis was done while looking at several factors.  The first was the 
level of accuracy in the cost estimation models used in this thesis to calculate the final 
cost estimates for FY2024.  In other words, how under, over or close to exact were the 
costs.  The second was addressing the sensitivity that a particular mix of ships in the 
battle force each year would potentially have on costs.  The third was measuring 
historical and future OMN and MPN budget trends compared to historical and future ship 
count trends to determine feasibility of financing these ships.  Finally, a look at how a 
few cost reduction initiatives in place by the Navy would financially impact (save) 
money and thereby help efforts towards affordability. 
                                                 









IV. DATA ANALYSIS – BATTLE FORCE INVENTORIES AND 
COST ESTIMATION MODELS 
A. BATTLE FORCE INVENTORIES 
The compilation of ship types counted toward the Navy’s battle force is defined 
by the Secretary of the Navy’s battle force instruction, 5030.8A.26  Specifically, “Battle 
force ships are commissioned United States ship (USS) warships capable of contributing 
to combat operations, or a United States naval ship (USNS) that contributes directly to 
Navy war fighting or support missions.” (SECNAVINST 5030.8A)  As indicated in 
Table 1, the Navy currently considers 26 out of 79 different types of vessels to be a part 
of the battle force inventory.  The remaining vessels, shown in Table 2 were not counted 
towards the battle force inventory since they do not meet the criteria defined within the 
instruction.  
 
Table 1.   Ships Counted in US Naval Battle Force as of FY11 (From: 27) 
                                                 
26 Dated 08February2011 
27 Compiled from SECNAVINST 5030.8A 
Warships Designator  Combat Logistics Ship Designator 
Multi-purpose Aircraft Carrier Nuclear-Powered CVN Ammunition Ship AE
Guided Missile Cruiser CG Dry Cargo and Ammunition Ship AKE
Guided Missile Destroyer DDG Oiler AO
Guided Missile Frigate FFG Fast Combat Support Ship AOE
Littoral Combat Ship LCS Combat Store Ship AFS
Attack Submarine Nuclear-Powered SSN Fleet Support Ships Designator 
Ballistic Missile Submarine Nuclear-Powered SSBN Command Ship LCC
Guided Missile Submarine Nuclear-Powered SSGN Submarine Tender AS
Amphibious Assault Ship General Purpose LHA Joint High Speed Vessel JHSV
Amphibious Assault Ship Multi-Purpose LHD Surveillance AGOS
Amphibious Transport Dock LPD Salvage Ship ARS
Dock Landing Ship LSD Fleet Ocean Tug ATF
Mine Countermeasures Ship MCM Mobile Landing Platform MLP
Dry Cargo/Ammunition T-AKE





Table 2.   Ships Not Counted in US Naval Battle Force as of FY11 (From: 28) 
During the period between 2010 and 2024, the types of ships, classes of ships and 
individual ships themselves will all change as new vessels are procured and 
commissioned into the fleet while others are decommissioned and removed.29  As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, before one can address the affordability and O&S 
costs of the Navy’s battle force mix, the actual composition of that force must be known 
first and foremost.   
Dissecting and transcribing the ships by type located in Table 1 into the more 
specific list of ships by class shown in Table 3, the appropriate inclusions of ship 
inventory quantities were identified.  From FY2010 to FY2024, the Navy’s battle force 
was expected to increase by 12.5 percent (36 ships) from 288 to 324 ships.  This was 
based on cross-related data largely drawn from the Navy’s FY2011 30 year shipbuilding 
plan, the FY2012 Shipbuilding and Conversion Navy Budget Estimates report and the 
Naval Vessel Registry maintained by Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA). 
                                                 
28 Compiled from SECNAVINST 5030.8A 
29 For classification purposes, the hierarchy for classifying ships is INDIVIDUAL ShipCLASS of 





Table 3.   Battle Force Inventory Levels in FY2010 & FY2024 (From: 30) 
                                                 
30 Ship counts compiled from OPNAV N8F’s “Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for 
Construction of Naval Vessels for FY2011,” FY2012 Shipbuilding and Conversion Navy Budget Estimates 
dated February2011, “Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY2012” report and the Naval Vessel 
Registry. 
Ship Class Designator FY2010 Ship Count FY2024 Ship Count
Multi-purpose Aircraft Carrier Nuclear-Powered CVN-65 1 0
Multi-purpose Aircraft Carrier Nuclear-Powered CVN-68 10 9
Multi-purpose Aircraft Carrier Nuclear-Powered CVN-78 0 2
Guided Missile Cruiser CG-47 22 11
Guided Missile Destroyer DDG-51 59 80
Guided Missile Destroyer DDG-1000 0 3
Guided Missile Frigate FFG-7 29 0
Littoral Combat Ship LCS-1 2 28
Attack Submarine Nuclear-Powered SSN-21 3 3
Attack Submarine Nuclear-Powered SSN-688 42 22
Attack Submarine Nuclear-Powered SSN-774 8 21
Ballistic Missile Submarine Nuclear-Powered SSBN-726 14 14
Guided Missile Submarine Nuclear-Powered SSGN-726 4 4
Amphibious Assault Ship General Purpose LHA-1 2 0
Amphibious Assault Ship General Purpose LHA-6 0 3
Amphibious Assault Ship Multi-Purpose LHD-1 8 8
Amphibious Transport Dock LPD-4 4 0
Amphibious Transport Dock LPD-17 5 11
Dock Landing Ship LSD-41 8 8
Dock Landing Ship LSD-49 4 4
Dock Landing Ship LSD-X 0 2
Mine Countermeasures Ship MCM-1 14 14
Ammunition Ship AE-26 3 0
Dry Cargo and Ammunition Ship AKE-1 10 11
Oiler AO-187 15 15
Fast Combat Support Ship AOE-6 4 4
Command Ship LCC-19 2 2
Submarine Tender AS-39 2 2
Joint High Speed Vessel JHSV-1 0 21
Surveillance AGOS-19 4 4
Surveillance AGOS-23 1 2
Salvage Ship ARS-50 4 4
Fleet Ocean Tug ATF-166 4 6
Mobile Landing Platform MLP-1 0 3
Dry Cargo/Ammunition T-AKE 0 3




Highlighting the classes of ships within the table was done to indicate what seem 
to be the largest changes within the battle force ship mix during this period.  That is to 
say, the changes that warrant the most attention in this table are the: 
 
Current or future additions of:    Current or future subtractions of: 
• CVN-78  
• DDG-1000  
• LCS-1  (Significant 
increase) 
• LHA-6  
• LSD-X  
• JHSV-1  
• MLP-1  
• T-AKE (Added to Fleet 
Support Category) 
• CVN-65 






Of these, the significant changes are the Enterprise class nuclear carrier’s (CVN-
68) replacement by the Gerald R. Ford class nuclear carrier, the Oliver Hazard Perry class 
frigate’s (FFG-7) replacement by the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and a significant 
increase in the fleet support section of the battle force as the Joint High Speed Vessel 
(JHSV) enters the fleet. 
B. COST ESTIMATION MODELS 
In the following 29 subsections are the cost modeling and analysis for each of 29 
classes of ship expected to be in the Navy’s FY2024 battle force.31  Actual recorded 
O&S costs were individually distinguished within the first figure provided under each 
class section, depicting each of its main costs drivers.  The regression equation, cost 
estimates and regression comparison tests then follow after that, in both figure and table 
format.  Table 4 is a compiled summary from these sections listing the cost estimation 
                                                 




models used to create the future cost estimates for each class of ship.  Table 5 is a 
compiled summary from these sections listing the future O&S cost estimates for each 
class of ship, derived from the cost models mentioned.   
 
Table 4.   Summary of Cost Estimation Models Used 
Model Used Model Used
CVN-68 Class Regression LSD-49 Class Regression
Manpower Regression Manpower 3-YR Moving AVG
Maintenance 3-YR Moving AVG Fuel Regression
CVN-78 Class Point Estimate Maintenance 3-YR Moving AVG
CG-47 Class Regression LSD-X Class Annalogous (LSD-49)
Manpower Regression MCM-1 Class Regression
Fuel Regression Manpower Regression
Maintenance 3-YR Moving AVG Maintenance 3-YR Moving AVG
DDG-51 Class Regression AKE-1 Class 3-YR Moving AVG
Manpower Regression AO-187 Class Regression
Fuel Regression Manpower 3-YR Moving AVG
Maintenance 3-YR Moving AVG Fuel 3-YR Moving AVG
DDG-1000 Class Point Estimate Maintenance 3-YR Moving AVG
LCS-1 Class Point Estimate AOE-6 Class Regression
SSN-21 Class Regression Manpower 3-YR Moving AVG
Manpower Regression Fuel Regression
Maintenance 3-YR Moving AVG Maintenance 3-YR Moving AVG
SSN-688 Class Regression LCC-19 Class Regression
Manpower Regression Manpower Regression
Maintenance 3-YR Moving AVG Fuel 3-YR Moving AVG
SSN-774 Class Regression Maintenance 3-YR Moving AVG
Maintenance 3-YR Moving AVG AS-39 Class Regression
SSBN-726 Class 3-YR Moving AVG Manpower 3-YR Moving AVG
SSGN-726 Class Regression Fuel 3-YR Moving AVG
Manpower Regression Maintenance 3-YR Moving AVG
Maintenance 3-YR Moving AVG JHSV-1 Class Point Estimate
LHA-6 Class Point Estimate AGOS-19 Class Regression
LHD-1 Class Regression Manpower 3-YR Moving AVG
Manpower Regression Energy (Fuel) 3-YR Moving AVG
Fuel 3-YR Moving AVG AGOS-23 Class Regression
Maintenance 3-YR Moving AVG Manpower 3-YR Moving AVG
LPD-17 Class 3-YR Moving AVG Energy (Fuel) 3-YR Moving AVG
LSD-41 Class Regression ARS-50 Class 3-YR Moving AVG
Manpower Regression ATF-166 Class 3-YR Moving AVG
Maintenance 3-YR Moving AVG MLP-1 Class Expert/Annalogous





Table 5.   Summary of Future O&S Cost Estimates Per Ship32 
1. Nimitz Class Aircraft Carrier (CVN-68) 
With recorded O&S costs ranging from $207.9M in FY1993 on the low end to 
$425.3M in FY2004 on the high end, the fluctuations and therefore volatility in costs for 
this class of ship seemed to make the task of estimating future costs extremely 
unpredictable.  A possible explanation of this variation, as shown in Figure 9, was that 
unlike manning costs, maintenance costs highly fluctuated each year, driven by for 
example, ship age, OPTEMPO and perhaps refueling.       
                                                 
32 The following ships were not included in Table 26 nor were cost estimates calculated since all were 
scheduled for decommissioning in the next few years (CVN-68, FFG-7, LHA-1, LPD-4 and AE-26). 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
CVN-68 408.0 408.8 418.6 422.2 428.3 433.0 439.7 443.8 449.2 454.4 459.7 465.0 470.3 475.6
CVN-78 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 392.5 392.5 392.5 392.5 392.5 392.5 392.5 392.5 392.5 392.5
CG-47 65.9 66.4 66.2 67.3 67.7 68.2 68.8 69.3 69.9 70.4 70.0 71.5 72.1 72.6
DDG-51 46.2 46.8 47.6 48.0 48.6 49.2 49.8 50.4 50.9 51.5 52.1 52.6 53.2 53.8
DDG-1000 0.0 0.0 83.3 83.3 83.3 83.3 83.3 83.8 83.8 83.8 83.8 83.8 83.8 83.8
LCS-1 36.4 36.4 36.4 36.4 36.4 36.4 36.4 36.4 36.4 36.4 36.4 36.4 36.4 36.4
SSN-21 55.3 58.8 61.7 58.8 60.0 60.4 60.0 60.3 60.4 60.4 60.6 60.7 60.8 60.9
SSN-688 37.8 37.0 37.3 38.1 38.2 38.5 39.0 39.3 39.6 40.0 40.3 40.7 41.0 41.4
SSN-774 20.8 22.0 23.1 22.0 22.3 22.5 22.3 22.4 22.4 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3
SSBN-726 77.1 73.2 76.8 76.2 76.6 76.7 76.7 76.7 76.7 76.7 76.7 76.7 76.7 76.7
SSGN-726 48.3 48.0 48.1 48.5 48.5 48.7 48.9 49.1 49.2 49.4 49.6 49.8 49.9 50.1
LHA-6 0.0 0.0 123.3 123.3 123.3 123.3 123.3 123.3 123.3 123.3 123.3 123.3 123.3 123.3
LHD-1 165.8 167.4 170.5 172.7 175.0 177.5 179.8 182.2 184.6 187.0 189.3 191.7 194.1 196.5
LPD-17 46.9 47.5 48.8 47.7 48.0 48.2 48.0 48.1 48.1 48.0 48.1 48.1 48.1 48.1
LSD-41 72.3 78.3 79.5 78.1 80.0 80.6 81.0 81.9 82.6 83.2 84.0 84.6 85.3 86.0
LSD-49 50.0 50.7 52.4 5.0 51.3 51.6 51.3 51.4 51.4 51.4 51.4 51.4 51.4 51.4
LSD-X 50.0 50.7 52.4 51.0 51.3 51.6 51.3 51.4 51.4 51.4 51.4 51.4 51.4 51.4
MCM-1 14.1 14.5 15.1 15.1 15.4 15.7 15.9 16.4 16.4 16.6 16.9 17.1 17.4 17.6
AKE-1 31.5 31.8 31.7 31.7 31.7 31.7 31.7 31.7 31.7 31.7 31.7 31.7 31.7 31.7
AO-187 24.7 24.3 24.6 24.5 24.4 24.5 24.5 24.5 24.5 24.5 24.5 24.5 24.5 24.5
AOE-6 38.4 37.2 36.5 37.3 37.0 36.9 37.1 37.0 37.0 37.0 37.0 37.0 37.0 37.0
LCC-19 94.4 94.9 94.1 97.2 97.8 99.0 100.5 101.7 103.0 104.3 105.5 106.8 108.1 109.4
AS-39 107.8 109.2 112.2 109.7 110.4 110.8 110.3 110.5 110.5 110.4 110.5 110.5 110.5 110.5
JHSV-1 0.0 27.7 27.7 27.7 27.7 27.7 27.7 27.7 27.7 27.7 27.7 27.7 27.7 27.7
AGOS-19 8.4 8.1 8.5 8.3 8.3 8.4 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3
AGOS-23 9.7 9.2 9.6 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5
ARS-50 10.4 40.5 11.0 10.7 10.8 10.8 10.8 10.8 10.8 10.8 10.8 10.8 10.8 10.8
ATF-166 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5
MLP-1 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0





Figure 9.   CVN-68 Costs by Top Two Cost Drivers 
Despite these challenges, regression analysis was completed and cost estimates 
made incorporating the calculated coefficients listed in Table 46 of APPENDIX C along 
with the simplified multivariable regression equation for CVN-68.  With no satisfactory 
regression possible for the maintenance cost factor, a simple moving three-year average 
was used for this variable.  In other words, “b3 + b4FY + b5MP” was the MPC 
(manpower) regression equation within the larger CVN-68 regression equation and “MC” 
was a simple average in this case.  




B0–5 = Coefficients, E= Error 
MPC and MC = Manpower and Maintenance Costs respectively 
FY and MP# = Fiscal Year and Manpower # 
A comparison of the results of the regression equation with the actual O&S costs 
recorded over the last 20 years was completed and as shown in Figure 10, the future cost 
Total CVN-68 O&S Cost = b0 + b1MPC + b2MC+ E 




estimates line (Est Total Cost) followed the actual costs line fairly well.  Table 6 also 
shows this but in numeric form pointing out that with an average cost variance of -.3 
percent, the model seemed to be very strong.  Using this model for future predictions 
yielded an O&S cost in FY2024 of $475.6M per ship which was a 20.5 percent growth 
from its FY2010 actual recorded cost of $394.4M.   
 






Table 6.   CVN-68 O&S Cost Variances 
2. Gerald R. Ford Class Aircraft Carrier (CVN-78) 
The first of the new nuclear powered Gerald R. Ford class aircraft carriers is not 
scheduled to enter the fleet until FY2015.  As such, no historical O&S cost data were 
available for regression modeling.  Therefore, a simple point estimate sufficed as a means 
of constructing the future O&S costs for this platform.33  See Figure 11.   
                                                 
33 O&S cost estimate provided by the Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) within the Defense 
Acquisition Management Information Retrieval (DAMIR) site.  
https://ebiz.acq.osd.mil/DAMIR/PortalMain/DamirPortal.aspx 
FY Actual Total Cost Est Total Cost Variance Variance %
1991 269,558,959 259,077,067 -10,481,892 -3.9%
1992 296,419,290 292,099,618 -4,319,672 -1.5%
1993 207,929,805 216,513,591 8,583,786 4.1%
1994 279,776,510 266,480,181 -13,296,329 -4.8%
1995 243,640,806 277,451,161 33,810,355 13.9%
1996 324,292,514 263,579,317 -60,713,197 -18.7%
1997 295,600,563 303,610,920 8,010,357 2.7%
1998 222,011,637 301,601,220 79,589,583 35.8%
1999 235,762,361 289,233,644 53,471,283 22.7%
2000 359,208,029 255,203,766 -104,004,263 -29.0%
2001 325,416,340 279,887,048 -45,529,292 -14.0%
2002 391,116,755 319,319,175 -71,797,580 -18.4%
2003 413,681,628 372,058,107 -41,623,521 -10.1%
2004 425,342,551 384,411,523 -40,931,028 -9.6%
2005 390,176,230 414,929,130 24,752,900 6.3%
2006 410,761,837 411,336,420 574,583 0.1%
2007 413,770,191 414,748,599 978,408 0.2%
2008 404,934,526 410,413,454 5,478,928 1.4%
2009 373,279,881 418,321,722 45,041,841 12.1%






Figure 11.   CVN-78 Costs by Area Based on SAR Report 
Manpower costs are expected to be less than those on the CVN-68 carriers due to 
reduced manning initiatives but maintenance is estimated to be higher, ultimately causing 
O&S costs to be similar for both platforms.34  As shown in Figure 11, total future O&S 
costs are expected to be $392.5M per ship.  Since this is a point estimate, this same cost 
was used for the cost estimated in FY2024 with a total of two of these ships accounted in 
the battle force by then.  Of note, use of this point estimate neglects any potential growth 
or declines in O&S costs throughout the projected forward.   
3. Ticonderoga Class Cruiser (CG-47) 
The top three cost drivers for the Ticonderoga class cruiser O&S costs have all 
maintained a fairly steady profile throughout the span of the 20 years in review.  
Manpower costs grew at an almost linear rate while fuel costs appeared to have flat-lined 
across the board.  It was not until the mid and late 2000’s did maintenance costs begin to 
influence overall costs more dramatically as seen by the matching contours in both the 
“Total Cost” and “Total Maintenance” lines within Figure 12.        
                                                 
34 Similar costs are observed when compared in FY2010.  However, since CVN-68 will continue to 
grow based on its cost model whereas no growth will occur for CVN-78 due to its costs being a static point 











B0–9 = Coefficients, E= Error 
MPC, FC, MC = Manpower, Fuel, and Maintenance Costs respectively 
FY, MP#, $GAL, HRSUW = Fiscal Year, Manpower #, Price/Gallon Fuel, and Steaming 
Hours Underway 
A comparison of the results of the regression equation with the actual O&S costs 
recorded over the last 20 years was completed and as shown in Figure 13, the future costs 
estimates line (Est Total Cost) followed fairly well to the actual costs line.  Table 7 also 
shows this but in numeric form pointing out that with an average cost variance of 
negative one percent, the model seemed to slightly underestimate the costs but 
nonetheless remained strong.  Using this model for future predictions yielded an O&S 
cost in FY2024 of $72.6M per ship which was a 21 percent growth from its FY2010 
actual recorded cost of $60M. 
Total CG-47 O&S Cost = b0 + b1MPC + b2FC +b3MC + E 





Figure 13.   Testing and Projection of CG-47 Regression Model 
 
Table 7.   CG-47 O&S Cost Variances 
4. Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer (DDG-51) 
Unlike the cruiser, the Arleigh Burke destroyer had a significantly different cost 
profile in regards to its top three cost drivers.  Figure 14 depicts both fuel and 
FY Actual Total Cost Est Total Cost Variance Variance %
1991 55,365,623 49,635,801 -5,729,822 -10.3%
1992 48,479,643 47,695,494 -784,149 -1.6%
1993 41,342,733 43,905,355 2,562,622 6.2%
1994 41,985,899 48,184,936 6,199,037 14.8%
1995 45,131,190 46,545,533 1,414,343 3.1%
1996 43,191,183 46,390,404 3,199,221 7.4%
1997 43,991,071 46,536,691 2,545,620 5.8%
1998 44,400,895 45,880,283 1,479,388 3.3%
1999 46,915,456 44,595,641 -2,319,815 -4.9%
2000 48,967,445 45,237,710 -3,729,735 -7.6%
2001 50,372,955 46,906,826 -3,466,129 -6.9%
2002 56,639,168 49,335,356 -7,303,812 -12.9%
2003 58,976,976 52,329,932 -6,647,044 -11.3%
2004 53,311,723 55,343,934 2,032,211 3.8%
2005 54,266,977 55,775,524 1,508,547 2.8%
2006 56,954,479 55,564,852 -1,389,627 -2.4%
2007 64,927,991 55,959,855 -8,968,136 -13.8%
2008 63,833,029 60,321,184 -3,511,845 -5.5%
2009 64,753,171 63,588,951 -1,164,220 -1.8%





maintenance costs appearing to remain steady over the years within a small range of 
variance that is, while manpower costs have almost doubled and therefore were much 
larger than the other two. 
 
Figure 14.   DDG-51 Cost by Top Three Cost Drivers 
Referring to Table 31 in APPENDIX B, there was a high correlation (over .7) 
between the manning and maintenance cost variables when creating the DDG-51 
regression equation.  High or often called, strong correlation simply implies that there is 
an above normal relationship between these two independent variables.35  Since 
correlation does not imply causation meaning that this high number does not necessarily 
mean it is causing any interaction between each other, and the cause of this interaction is 
unknown if any even exists, it was decided to simply ignore this correlation point and still 





                                                 
35 Normally accepted levels are below .7 and above -.7 for this thesis. 
Total DDG-51 O&S Cost = b0 + b1MPC + b2FC +b3MC + E 





B0–9 = Coefficients, E= Error 
MPC, FC, MC = Manpower, Fuel, and Maintenance Costs respectively 
FY, MP#, $GAL, HRSUW = Fiscal Year, Manpower #, Price/Gallon Fuel, and Steaming 
Hours Underway 
A comparison of the results of the regression equation with the actual O&S costs 
recorded over the last 19 years was completed and as shown in Figure 15, the future costs 
estimates line (Est Total Cost) followed fairly well to the actual costs line.  Table 8 also 
shows this but in numeric form pointing out that with an average cost variance of -.5 
percent, the model seemed to be very strong.  Using this model for future predictions 
yielded an O&S cost in FY2024 of $53.8M per ship which was a 21 percent growth from 
its FY2010 actual recorded cost of $44.4M. 
 





Table 8.   DDG-51 O&S Cost Variances 
5. Zumwalt Class Destroyer (DDG-1000)  
The first of only three DDG-1000 destroyers scheduled for production is not 
slated to be delivered to the Navy until late FY2013 or early FY2014.36  Again, similar to 
the new aircraft carrier, no historical data were available for cost regression modeling so 
a point estimate was used in its place.  The breakdown of O&S costs are shown in Figure 
16 with total O&S costs estimated to be $83M per ship.  This was the amount used in 
FY2024.  Again, this point estimate cost remained stagnant and therefore showed no 
effects of potential growth or decline leading into FY2024.      
                                                 
36 Per the Shipbuilding and Conversion Navy (SCN) budget report for FY11. 
FY Actual Total Cost Est Total Cost Variance Variance %
1992 33,729,743 33,340,298 -389,445 -1.2%
1993 32,928,223 32,078,368 -849,855 -2.6%
1994 32,928,209 34,633,226 1,705,017 5.2%
1995 35,296,175 34,492,811 -803,364 -2.3%
1996 34,202,486 35,526,058 1,323,572 3.9%
1997 39,233,691 36,458,716 -2,774,975 -7.1%
1998 33,889,322 37,634,116 3,744,794 11.1%
1999 32,968,924 36,540,984 3,572,060 10.8%
2000 38,670,381 35,829,136 -2,841,245 -7.3%
2001 38,433,372 35,796,740 -2,636,632 -6.9%
2002 42,963,210 37,710,224 -5,252,986 -12.2%
2003 44,471,210 40,771,083 -3,700,127 -8.3%
2004 42,165,370 42,118,391 -46,979 -0.1%
2005 43,523,831 43,231,960 -291,871 -0.7%
2006 44,402,211 43,810,578 -591,633 -1.3%
2007 45,834,243 44,598,813 -1,235,430 -2.7%
2008 44,861,667 45,722,805 861,138 1.9%
2009 42,741,912 46,037,771 3,295,859 7.7%






Figure 16.   DDG-1000 Costs by Area Based on SAR Report 
6. Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) 
As a new platform, the Littoral Combat Ship has just recently entered the fleet 
with its first two ships online in FY2010.  With only one year of cost data available for 
analysis, no regression model was possible.  Instead, a point estimate of $36.4M per ship 
broken down into its three main cost areas show in Figure 17 based on its SAR report 
was utilized for its FY2024 cost. 
 
 




7. Seawolf Class Attack Submarine (SSN-21) 
The Seawolf class submarine is a small class of submarines with only three 
commissioned into the fleet before production was halted.  One of, it not the only driver 
for this decision by the Navy was due to the very quick increases in maintenance costs to 
operate and maintain such vessels.  Tracing the “Total Maintenance” line in Figure 18 
from FY2003 onward, maintenance costs have increased by nearly 500 percent over this 
eight year period while manning costs have remained almost unchanged.   
 





B0–6 = Coefficients, E= Error 
MPC and MC = Manpower and Maintenance Costs respectively 
OFF#, EL# and FY = Officer#, Enlisted# and Fiscal Year 
 
Total SSN-21 O&S Cost = b0 + b1MPC + b2MC+ E 




Referring to Table 32 in APPENDIX B, there was a high correlation (over .7) 
between the manning and maintenance cost variables when creating the SSN-21 
regression equation.  Similarly to what was done with the DDG-51 regression model, it 
was decided to simply ignore this correlation point and still use all variables.   
A comparison of the results of the regression equation with the actual O&S costs 
recorded over the last 13 years was completed and as shown in Figure 19, the future costs 
estimates line (Est Total Cost) was a hit and miss in regards to alignment with the actual 
costs (Actual Total Cost) line but was the best option for future cost estimation in this 
thesis.  Table 9 also shows this but in numeric form pointing out that with an average cost 
variance of -14.6 percent, the model tends to underestimate the actual O&S costs.  Using 
this model for future predictions yielded an O&S cost in FY2024 of $60.9M per boat 
which was a 13 percent decline from its FY2010 actual recorded cost of $70M.  This 
decrease was based on the assumption that maintenance costs will begin to taper off and 
settle in the future. 
 
 





Table 9.   SSN-21 O&S Cost Variances 
8. Los Angeles Class Attack Submarine (SSN-688) 
Similar to the Seawolf class submarines, manning costs remained steady 
throughout the history of the platform but maintenance costs were volatile.  Fortunately 
for this cost profile, maintenance costs seemed to oscillate in a drawn out and somewhat 
predictable pattern shown in Figure 20 which the regression model shows through its 
results in Figure 21.   
 
Figure 20.   SSN-688 Costs by Top Two Cost Drivers 
 
FY Actual Total Cost Est Total Cost Variance Variance %
1998 13,781,369 13,337,889 -443,480 -3.2%
1999 10,955,868 11,311,660 355,792 3.2%
2000 18,471,253 18,415,990 -55,263 -0.3%
2001 17,603,198 14,569,804 -3,033,394 -17.2%
2002 15,960,230 15,493,763 -466,467 -2.9%
2003 26,459,957 18,103,274 -8,356,683 -31.6%
2004 45,614,404 20,411,208 -25,203,196 -55.3%
2005 46,059,168 30,251,247 -15,807,921 -34.3%
2006 41,564,917 39,424,993 -2,139,924 -5.1%
2007 37,513,210 44,641,022 7,127,812 19.0%
2008 44,210,667 41,545,408 -2,665,259 -6.0%
2009 50,165,462 40,853,922 -9,311,540 -18.6%









B0–5 = Coefficients, E= Error 
MPC and MC = Manpower and Maintenance Costs respectively 
FY and MP# = Fiscal Year and Manpower # 
A comparison of the results of the regression equation with the actual O&S costs 
recorded over the last 20 years was completed and as shown in Figure 21 and Table 10, 
the estimation model struggled with matching actual costs to estimated costs, ultimately 
tending on average, to overestimate costs by 5.3 percent.  The use of this model for future 
predictions yielded an O&S cost in FY2024 of $41.4M per boat which was a 28 percent 
growth from its FY2010 actual recorded cost of $34.5.   
 
Figure 21.   Testing and Projection of SSN-688 O&S Costs 
Total SSN-688 O&S Cost = b0 + b1MPC + b2MC+ E 





Table 10.   SSN-688 O&S Cost Variances 
9. Virginia Class Attack Submarine (SSN-774) 
The Virginia class submarine has been in the fleet just over a half decade 
producing only five years of cost data.  As such, little change was observed in costs with 
the exception of FY2010 in which maintenance costs nearly tripled.  See Figure 22. 
 
Figure 22.   SSN-774 Costs by Top Two Cost Drivers 
FY Actual Total Cost Est Total Cost Variance Variance %
1991 35,490,979 35,845,739 354,760 1.0%
1992 38,742,983 38,573,690 -169,293 -0.4%
1993 41,012,050 41,853,080 841,030 2.1%
1994 32,291,407 39,463,533 7,172,126 22.2%
1995 26,193,428 38,346,504 12,153,076 46.4%
1996 22,439,205 34,011,816 11,572,611 51.6%
1997 24,531,467 27,360,056 2,828,589 11.5%
1998 25,456,633 24,139,889 -1,316,744 -5.2%
1999 28,461,215 23,644,560 -4,816,655 -16.9%
2000 23,468,993 25,297,511 1,828,518 7.8%
2001 40,655,676 29,115,940 -11,539,736 -28.4%
2002 46,238,926 34,117,317 -12,121,609 -26.2%
2003 51,573,031 40,025,921 -11,547,110 -22.4%
2004 49,257,402 45,345,943 -3,911,459 -7.9%
2005 46,620,668 48,639,356 2,018,688 4.3%
2006 45,011,307 48,912,890 3,901,583 8.7%
2007 38,603,676 46,971,706 8,368,030 21.7%
2008 39,703,962 43,419,173 3,715,211 9.4%
2009 36,217,564 41,602,526 5,384,962 14.9%








B0–1 = Coefficients, E= Error 
MC = Maintenance Costs respectively 
Due to the lack of data points to use to construct a strong regression model, there 
was little difference between using either a regression model or a three-year moving 
average as Figures 23 and 24 will demonstrate respectively.  Within the regression 
model, the manning cost variable was excluded due to its prevention of a satisfactory 
regression result.  Therefore, only maintenance was included as the independent variable 
in this particular case.    
 
Figure 23.   Testing and Projection of SSN-774 O&S Cost (Regression) 
A comparison of the results of the regression equation with the actual O&S costs 
recorded over the last five years was completed.  Future predictions yielded an O&S cost 
in FY2024 of $22.3M per boat which was a 16 percent decline from its FY2010 actual 
recorded cost of $26.7M.  This drop was largely based on the simple fact that there were 
so few data points to analyze which has caused on average, an 8.3 underestimation of the 
Total SSN-774 O&S Cost = b0 + b1MC + E 




costs.  See Table 11.  It was also believed the reduction in costs are contributed the 
potential tapering off of high maintenance costs as seen in FY2010, eventually returning 
to a steady pattern.  
 
Figure 24.   Testing and Projection of SSN-774 O&S Costs (Average) 
 
Table 11.   SSN-774 O&S Cost Variances 
10. Ohio Class Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN-726) 
Maintenance costs, illustrated in Figure 25, to maintain and operate the Ohio class 
submarine over the last 20 years have fluctuated enough that no satisfactory regression 
model was achievable.  Instead, a three-year moving average was used to estimate the 
future O&S costs expected to be incurred.  Comparing the results of the averaging model 
against the actual O&S costs recorded over the last 20 years, yielded an O&S cost in 
FY2024 of $76.7M per boat which was a negligible decrease from its FY2010 actual 
recorded cost of $77.2.  Refer to Figure 26 and Table 12.   
FY Actual Total Cost Est Total Cost Variance Variance %
2006 17,839,898 16,531,079 -1,308,819 -7.3%
2007 16,076,004 16,925,157 849,153 5.3%
2008 16,940,299 17,307,278 366,979 2.2%
2009 18,275,150 16,921,171 -1,353,979 -7.4%







Figure 25.   SSBN-726 Costs by Top Two Cost Drivers 
 





Table 12.   SSBN-726 O&S Cost Variances 
11. Ohio Class Guided Missile Submarine (SSGN-726) 
The Ohio class submarine suffered two abnormally high years in O&S costs 
during FY2005 and FY2006.  The cause, as shown in Figure 27 was the more than 
tripling of the maintenance costs for those two years when compared to the years prior to 
and following these events.   
 
FY Actual Total Cost Est Total Cost Variance Variance %
1991 84,729,770 84,729,770 0 0.0%
1992 101,956,955 101,956,955 0 0.0%
1993 63,838,355 63,838,355 0 0.0%
1994 75,950,714 83,508,360 7,557,646 10.0%
1995 79,943,038 80,582,008 638,970 0.8%
1996 68,979,280 73,244,036 4,264,756 6.2%
1997 59,431,876 74,957,677 15,525,801 26.1%
1998 56,996,876 69,451,398 12,454,522 21.9%
1999 53,881,698 61,802,677 7,920,979 14.7%
2000 60,539,406 56,770,150 -3,769,256 -6.2%
2001 67,962,847 57,139,327 -10,823,520 -15.9%
2002 73,175,985 60,794,650 -12,381,335 -16.9%
2003 62,621,137 67,226,079 4,604,942 7.4%
2004 67,466,221 67,919,990 453,769 0.7%
2005 71,654,511 67,754,448 -3,900,063 -5.4%
2006 112,445,899 67,247,290 -45,198,609 -40.2%
2007 80,471,141 83,855,544 3,384,403 4.2%
2008 79,858,691 88,190,517 8,331,826 10.4%
2009 74,318,868 90,925,244 16,606,376 22.3%






Figure 27.   SSGN-726 Costs by Top Two Cost Drivers 
Referring to Table 35 in APPENDIX B, there was a high correlation (over .7) 
between the fiscal year (FY) manning number (MP#) independent variables within the 
manpower cost regression model.  Similarly to what was done with previous regression 
models that suffered from correlation, and where additional tests/models were created 
without these variables, it was decided to simply ignore this correlation point and still use 





B0–5 = Coefficients, E= Error 
MPC and MC = Manpower and Maintenance Costs respectively 
FY and MP# = Fiscal Year and Manpower # 
A comparison of the results of the regression model with the actual O&S costs 
recorded over the last 20 years was completed and is as shown in Figure 28, it was 
difficult predicting the O&S costs due to the two large spikes in maintenance costs 
Total SSGN-726 O&S Cost = b0 + b1MPC + b2MC+ E 




mentioned earlier.  This caused a very high over estimation in costs on the average of 
32.5 percent as shown in Table 13.  Nonetheless, was assumed that these spikes have 
leveled off just as the rest of Figure 27 shows.  Future predictions yielded an O&S cost in 
FY2024 of $50.1M per boat which is a 4.6 percent growth from its FY2010 actual 
recorded cost of $47.9.   
 
Figure 28.   Testing and Projection of SSGN-726 Regression Model 
 
Table 13.   SSGN-726 O&S Cost Variances 
12. America Class Amphibious Ship (LHA-6) 
With the intent of replacing the older Tarawa class ships (LHA-1), the first of the 
new America class amphibious ships is currently scheduled for delivery to the Navy in 
late FY2013.  A point estimate was used for future cost estimating based on the SAR 
O&S data shown in Figure 29.  Total O&S costs were estimated to be $123.3M per ship 
FY Actual Total Cost Est Total Cost Variance Variance %
2003 27,073,340 26,726,990 -346,350 -1.3%
2004 49,276,238 49,522,222 245,984 0.5%
2005 109,087,529 107,776,117 -1,311,412 -1.2%
2006 108,848,480 61,683,582 -47,164,898 -43.3%
2007 57,993,244 89,391,769 31,398,525 54.1%
2008 48,929,228 92,586,977 43,657,749 89.2%
2009 47,764,923 73,076,706 25,311,783 53.0%





which served as the amount used in FY2024 as well.  Of note, unlike the DDG-1000 in 
which maintenance costs were the most expensive, in this particular case, manpower 
costs consumed the most costs.   
 
Figure 29.   LHA-6 Costs by Area Based on SAR Report 
13. Wasp Class Amphibious Ship (LHD-1) 
When stretched over the 20 years, the O&S costs incurred by the Wasp class ships 
have increased gradually, essentially doubling throughout this time.  With a recorded low 
of $78.6M in total actual costs in FY1993 to a high of $158.4 as current as FY2010, these 
increases, shown in Figure 30 were contributed rather equally by both manning and 










B0–6 = Coefficients, E= Error 
MPC, FC, MC = Manpower, Fuel, and Maintenance Costs respectively 
FY and EL# = Fiscal Year and Enlisted# 
A comparison of the results of the regression equation with the actual O&S costs 
recorded over the last 20 years was completed.  As shown in Figure 31, the future costs 
estimates (Est Total Cost) line followed fairly well to the actual costs line.  Based on its 
continued trajectory, there was some warrant for concern over extremely high cost 
growths in the future even when considering the tendency that these estimates were 
underestimated by a mean of 1.3 percent as Table 14 shows.  Using this model for future 
predictions yielded an O&S cost in FY2024 of $196.5M per ship which was a 24 percent 
growth from its FY2010 actual recorded cost of $158.4M. 
Total LHD-1 O&S Cost = b0 + b1MPC + b2FC +b3MC + E 






Figure 31.   Testing and Projection of LHD-1 Regression Model 
 
Table 14.   LHD-1 O&S Cost Variances 
FY Actual Total Cost Est Total Cost Variance Variance %
1991 93,255,774 86,667,117 -6,588,657 -7.1%
1992 113,470,368 112,422,887 -1,047,481 -0.9%
1993 78,602,261 83,472,376 4,870,115 6.2%
1994 107,028,172 98,952,885 -8,075,287 -7.5%
1995 97,221,492 108,252,834 11,031,342 11.3%
1996 122,130,317 104,431,923 -17,698,394 -14.5%
1997 120,969,728 119,462,913 -1,506,815 -1.2%
1998 102,452,279 119,598,133 17,145,854 16.7%
1999 97,559,748 119,505,076 21,945,328 22.5%
2000 109,903,727 108,143,245 -1,760,482 -1.6%
2001 115,435,945 105,899,159 -9,536,786 -8.3%
2002 134,662,729 111,591,232 -23,071,497 -17.1%
2003 154,274,603 124,049,323 -30,225,280 -19.6%
2004 141,212,593 137,386,418 -3,826,175 -2.7%
2005 142,808,161 144,320,571 1,512,410 1.1%
2006 129,279,641 146,954,845 17,675,204 13.7%
2007 152,348,884 140,547,567 -11,801,317 -7.7%
2008 159,810,699 145,160,243 -14,650,456 -9.2%
2009 154,931,734 152,217,325 -2,714,409 -1.8%





14. San Antonio Class Amphibious Ship (LPD-17) 
The San Antonio class ship is a fairly young platform with four years of cost data 
available.  As such, little changes to cost profiles were observed but instead reflect steady 
costs for all three categories, shown in Figure 32.  Since the lack of data years prevented 
a possible regression model from being calculated, a three-year moving average model 
was used for future cost estimates instead. 
 
Figure 32.   LPD-17 Costs by Top Three Cost Drivers 
A comparison of the results of the averaging model with the actual O&S costs 
recorded over the last four years was completed and Figure 33 and Table 15 show the 
comparison of the two.  Using this model yielded an O&S cost in FY2024 of $48M per 
ship which was an approximate 7.7 percent decrease from its FY2010 actual recorded 
cost of $52.1.  The decrease was based solely on the model in which little cost data were 





Figure 33.   Testing and Projection of LPD-17 Model 
 
Table 15.   LPD-17 O&S Cost Variances 
15. Whidbey Island Class Amphibious Ship (LSD-41) 
In Figure 34, the upward trend is O&S costs were very noticeable, growing from 
initially just under $30.1M to the later $82.7M in the 20 years observed.  It is worth 
mentioning that although manning costs were higher than fuel and maintenance costs 
during most of this time, beginning in FY2009 and into FY2010, maintenance costs 
finally surpassed manning costs.   
FY Actual Total Cost Est Total Cost Variance Variance %
2007 40,342,796 40,342,796 0 0.0%
2008 45,287,875 45,287,875 0 0.0%
2009 43,404,896 43,404,896 0 0.0%











B0–5 = Coefficients, E= Error 
MPC and MC = Manpower and Maintenance Costs respectively 
FY and MP# = Fiscal Year and Manpower # 
A comparison of the results of the regression model with the actual O&S costs 
recorded over the last 20 years was completed.  Figure 35 and Table 16 show the 
comparison of the two in which the model tended to underestimate the actual costs by 5.2 
percent.  Despite the actual costs tripling over the last 20 years, the model only predicted 
a future growth of four percent.  That is to say, it yielded an O&S cost in FY2024 of 
$86M per ship compared to its FY2010 actual recorded cost of $82.7M.  
Total LSD-41 O&S Cost = b0 + b1MPC + b2MC + E 






Figure 35.   Testing and Projection of LSD-41 Regression Model   
 
Table 16.   LSD-41 O&S Cost Variances 
FY Actual Total Cost Est Total Cost Variance Variance %
1991 30,910,357 28,407,623 -2,502,734 -8.1%
1992 34,085,463 32,375,312 -1,710,151 -5.0%
1993 28,002,957 28,910,270 907,313 3.2%
1994 30,091,046 31,289,401 1,198,355 4.0%
1995 33,828,381 32,375,896 -1,452,485 -4.3%
1996 31,050,578 33,554,707 2,504,129 8.1%
1997 33,967,077 34,479,889 512,812 1.5%
1998 35,550,462 35,374,989 -175,473 -0.5%
1999 35,689,105 35,208,896 -480,209 -1.3%
2000 40,169,796 36,265,260 -3,904,536 -9.7%
2001 35,983,318 38,587,746 2,604,428 7.2%
2002 48,055,530 39,634,031 -8,421,499 -17.5%
2003 50,072,488 44,511,145 -5,561,343 -11.1%
2004 57,282,904 46,796,656 -10,486,248 -18.3%
2005 52,347,871 49,771,795 -2,576,076 -4.9%
2006 48,127,325 50,595,962 2,468,637 5.1%
2007 48,642,435 51,073,838 2,431,403 5.0%
2008 52,661,195 51,753,504 -907,691 -1.7%
2009 73,057,255 52,466,320 -20,590,935 -28.2%





16. Harpers Ferry Class Amphibious Ship (LSD-49) 
The Harpers Ferry class of ships seemed to almost mimic the LSD-41 ships in 
cost profile but on a smaller scale as shown in Figure 36.  It too showed signs of 
increasing maintenance costs to the point where they were surpassing manning costs in 
FY2010 just as LSD-41 maintenance costs did so in FY2009–2010.  In addition, rather 
than tripling in costs as LSD-41 did, LSD-49 fell just short of doubling.         
 
Figure 36.   LSD-49 Costs by Top Three Cost Drivers 
Referring to Table 38 in APPENDIX B, there was a high correlation (over .7) 
between the manning cost (MPC) and fuel cost (FC) independent variables within the 
LSD-49 regression model.  Similarly to what was done with previous regression models 
that suffered from correlation and where additional tests/models were created without 
these variables, it was decided to simply ignore this correlation and still use all variables 





B0–6 = Coefficients, E= Error 
Total LSD-49 O&S Cost = b0 + b1MPC + b2FC + b3MC + E 




MPC, FC, MC = Manpower, Fuel, and Maintenance Costs respectively 
$GAL and HRSUW = Price/Gallon Fuel and Steaming Hours Underway 
A comparison of the results of the regression model with the actual O&S costs 
recorded over the last 15 years was completed.  Figure 37 and Table 17 show the 
comparison of the two in which the model tended to underestimate actual costs by 4.1 
percent.  Despite the actual costs nearly doubling during this time, the regression model 
predicted a relatively steady O&S cost amount leading up to FY2024.  That is to say, 
using this model yielded an O&S cost in FY2024 of $51.4 per ship compared to its 
FY2010 actual recorded cost of $56M.  This decrease in costs could possibly be 
explained by the decrease in manning numbers over time which has ranged from a low of 
293 in FY2009 to a high of 356 in FY2004 with 308 as the average into the future.    
 





Table 17.   LSD-49 O&S Cost Variances 
17. Unnamed Future Class Amphibious Ship (LSD-X) 
Scheduled to begin replacing the LSD-41 ships in FY2017, there currently are no 
acquisition data available or SAR report for the new LSD-X.37  With two ships expected 
to be commissioned into the fleet before FY2024, the cost estimate used in its place was 
an analogous one drawn from the cost data used in the LSD-49 platform.  Therefore an 
estimated O&S cost of $51.4M (same as LSD-49) was used for FY2024. 
18. Avenger Class Mine Counter Measures Ship (MCM-1)  
Despite the new Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) joining the ranks within the battle 
force, the mine counter measure ships still have a future well into FY2024.  The cost 
profile broken into its top three cost drivers illustrated in Figure 38 shows a very steady 
cost trend during this last decade.       
                                                 
37 Per OPNAV N8F’s “Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval 
Vessels for FY2011.” 
FY Actual Total Cost Est Total Cost Variance Variance %
1996 31,196,015 33,645,878 2,449,863 7.9%
1997 37,025,347 37,520,594 495,247 1.3%
1998 33,147,313 33,594,805 447,492 1.4%
1999 29,236,291 34,920,426 5,684,135 19.4%
2000 35,204,844 33,406,641 -1,798,203 -5.1%
2001 34,651,227 32,592,293 -2,058,934 -5.9%
2002 41,425,869 32,617,290 -8,808,579 -21.3%
2003 46,928,096 36,705,907 -10,222,189 -21.8%
2004 40,207,244 40,486,230 278,986 0.7%
2005 44,979,907 42,425,674 -2,554,233 -5.7%
2006 49,197,734 43,147,320 -6,050,414 -12.3%
2007 49,087,273 44,816,364 -4,270,909 -8.7%
2008 48,896,558 47,694,801 -1,201,757 -2.5%
2009 45,802,188 49,178,984 3,376,796 7.4%











B0–5 = Coefficients, E= Error 
MPC and MC = Manpower and Maintenance Costs respectively 
FY and MP# = Fiscal Year and Manpower # 
A comparison of the results of the regression model with the actual O&S costs 
recorded over the last 20 years was completed and Figure 39 and Table 18 show the 
comparison of the two.  Using this model for future predictions yielded an O&S cost in 
FY2024 of $17.6M per ship which was a 21.4 percent growth from the FY2010 actual 
recorded cost of $14.5M.   
Total MCM-1 O&S Cost = b0 + b1MPC + b2MC+ E 





Figure 39.   Testing and Projection of MCM-1 Regression Model 
 
Table 18.   MCM-1 O&S Cost Variances 
FY Actual Total Cost Est Total Cost Variance Variance %
1991 8,001,840 9,654,737 1,652,897 20.7%
1992 7,716,604 7,144,786 -571,818 -7.4%
1993 7,109,935 7,085,188 -24,747 -0.3%
1994 7,493,133 8,458,748 965,615 12.9%
1995 8,749,312 7,888,336 -860,976 -9.8%
1996 8,128,919 8,436,578 307,659 3.8%
1997 15,974,833 8,877,712 -7,097,121 -44.4%
1998 13,846,321 11,368,486 -2,477,835 -17.9%
1999 8,808,692 13,017,745 4,209,053 47.8%
2000 13,234,992 13,174,537 -60,455 -0.5%
2001 10,707,833 12,293,937 1,586,104 14.8%
2002 12,642,881 11,128,676 -1,514,205 -12.0%
2003 12,323,412 12,082,268 -241,144 -2.0%
2004 13,350,602 11,594,694 -1,755,908 -13.2%
2005 12,244,138 12,392,190 148,052 1.2%
2006 11,649,775 12,502,473 852,698 7.3%
2007 12,260,826 12,874,006 613,180 5.0%
2008 12,957,838 12,958,060 222 0.0%
2009 12,216,428 13,188,507 972,079 8.0%





19. Dry Cargo and Ammunition Ship (AKE-1) 
As Figure 40 shows, this class of ship is a young platform with only four years of 
cost data available.  As a result, a three-year moving average served as the cost 
estimating model.  
 
Figure 40.   AKE-1 Costs by Top Three Cost Drivers 
A comparison of the results of the averaging model with the actual O&S costs 
recorded over the last few years was completed and Figure 41 and Table 19 show the 
comparison of the two.  Using this model for future predictions yielded an O&S cost in 
FY2024 of $31.7M per ship which was a negligible increase from the FY2010 actual 






Figure 41.   Testing and Projection of AKE-1 Model 
 
Table 19.   AKE-1 O&S Cost Variances 
20. Oiler Ship (AO-187) 
One might think after reviewing Figure 42 that actual and estimated costs would 
result in near perfect numbers since all three cost drivers appeared to be steady.  However 
when zoomed further in as is done in Figure 43, there was quite a lot of volatility, even if 
on a smaller scale when compared to other platforms.   
FY Actual Total Cost Est Total Cost Variance Variance %
2007 27,126,405 27,126,405 0 0.0%
2008 30,629,707 30,629,707 0 0.0%
2009 32,421,493 32,421,493 0 0.0%






Figure 42.   AO-187 Costs by Top Three Cost Drivers 
 
   
 
Where, 
B0–3 = Coefficients, E= Error 
MPC, EC, MC = Manpower, Energy (Fuel) and Maintenance Costs respectively 
Referring to Table 40 in APPENDIX B, there was a high correlation (over .7) 
between the energy cost (EC) and maintenance cost (MC) independent variables within 
the regression model.  Following suit from other models, this was ignored since changes 
were negligible. 
A comparison of the results of the regression model with the actual O&S costs 
recorded over the last 14 years was completed.  Figure 43 and Table 20 show the 
comparison of the two in which the model tended to underestimate cost by 2.2 percent on 
average.  Using this model for future predictions yielded an O&S cost in FY2024 of 
$24.5M per ship which was a four percent decrease from the FY2010 actual recorded 
Total AO-187 O&S Cost = b0 + b1MPC + b2FC+ b3MC + E 




cost of $25.4M.  This decrease was assumed to be driven by the model in which all three 
cost drivers were relatively steady at $25M or under in actual costs.  
 
Figure 43.   Testing and Projection of AO-187 Regression Model 
 
Table 20.   AO-187 O&S Cost Variances 
21. Fast Combat Support Ship (AOE-6) 
The cost profiles for the Fast Combat Support Ships showed a significant increase 
from FY2001 to FY2006 before declining back downward as seen in Figure 44.  A 
possible explanation for this was simply due to the four ships in its class being employed 
FY Actual Total Cost Est Total Cost Variance Variance %
1997 22,538,063 22,789,036 250,973 1.1%
1998 21,513,716 21,747,448 233,732 1.1%
1999 24,406,590 24,019,417 -387,173 -1.6%
2000 18,664,307 22,851,967 4,187,660 22.4%
2001 21,198,112 21,479,732 281,620 1.3%
2002 22,324,804 21,284,034 -1,040,771 -4.7%
2003 19,991,436 20,557,860 566,424 2.8%
2004 21,705,433 21,004,244 -701,189 -3.2%
2005 24,689,485 21,395,016 -3,294,470 -13.3%
2006 24,915,940 22,283,608 -2,632,333 -10.6%
2007 25,103,526 24,086,144 -1,017,382 -4.1%
2008 25,617,471 25,063,099 -554,373 -2.2%
2009 23,679,539 25,495,353 1,815,814 7.7%





less towards the later part of the decade, which happened to coincide with a projected 
winding down of military operations within the Arabian Gulf region.   
 
Figure 44.   Costs by Top Three Cost Drivers 
Referring to Table 41 in APPENDIX B, there was a high correlation (over .7) 
between the manpower cost (MC) and maintenance cost (MC) independent variables 
within the regression model.  Following suit from previous models, this was ignored 





B0–6 = Coefficients, E= Error 
MPC, EC, MC = Manpower, Energy (Fuel), and Maintenance Costs respectively 
$GAL and HRSUW = Price/Gallon Fuel and Steaming Hours Underway 
A comparison of the results of the regression model with the actual O&S costs 
recorded over the last 10 years was completed.  Figure 45 and Table 21 show the 
comparison of the two in which the model, on average, underestimated the actual costs by 
Total AOE-6 O&S Cost = b0 + b1MPC + b2EC + b3MC+ E 





16.2 percent.  Using this model for future predictions yielded an O&S cost in FY2024 of 
$37M per ship which was a six percent decrease from the FY2010 actual recorded cost of 
$39.5M.  This decrease was assumed to be driven by the model in which all three 
recorded actual cost areas were trending back downward.  
 
Figure 45.   Testing and Projection of AOE-6 Regression Model 
 
Table 21.   AOE-6 O&S Cost Variances 
22. Blue Ridge Class Command Ship (LCC-19) 
The only two Blue Ridge class command ships in the battle force inventory have 
already reached their 40 year mark in terms of service in the fleet and are currently 
scheduled to remain a part of it into FY2024.  As Figure 46 illustrates, this aging platform 
FY Actual Total Cost Est Total Cost Variance Variance %
2001 14,786,355 14,056,820 -729,535 -4.9%
2002 26,216,835 24,840,170 -1,376,664 -5.3%
2003 27,250,460 26,048,170 -1,202,289 -4.4%
2004 39,674,674 21,647,454 -18,027,219 -45.4%
2005 49,094,832 28,493,032 -20,601,800 -42.0%
2006 46,929,630 32,953,827 -13,975,803 -29.8%
2007 52,871,334 37,330,150 -15,541,185 -29.4%
2008 49,748,491 40,127,150 -9,621,341 -19.3%
2009 44,674,035 41,321,280 -3,352,755 -7.5%





has suffered from significant maintenance cost spikes throughout the years and will 
probably continue to worsen as it gets older.     
 





B0–6 = Coefficients, E= Error 
MPC, FC, MC = Manpower, Fuel, and Maintenance Costs respectively 
FY and MP# = Fiscal Year and Manpower # 
A comparison of the results of the regression model against the actual O&S costs 
recorded over the last 20 years was completed and Figure 47 and Table 22 show the 
comparison of the two.  Using this model for future predictions yielded an O&S cost in 
FY2024 of $109.4M per ship which was a 32 percent increase from the FY2010 actual 
recorded cost of $82.8M.  This significant increase was assumed to be driven by the 
increasingly larger maintenance fluctuations experienced over the last two decades of 
Total LCC-19 O&S Cost = b0 + b1MPC + b2FC+ b3MC+ E 




which was expected to continue as this class of ships’ service life is extended beyond 
fifty years of service as it enters FY2024.   
 






Table 22.   LCC-19 O&S Cost Variances 
23. Submarine Tender Ship (AS-39) 
As the “Manning cost” line in Figure 48 shows, manning costs have dominated 
the total O&S costs incurred by the submarine tender ships, increasing from 
approximately $56M to $90M while fuel and maintenance costs remained comparatively 
low. 
  
FY Actual Total Cost Est Total Cost Variance Variance %
1991 68,242,478 66,257,769 -1,984,709 -2.9%
1992 64,188,885 63,596,336 -592,549 -0.9%
1993 76,420,527 77,814,131 1,393,604 1.8%
1994 56,131,594 71,778,359 15,646,765 27.9%
1995 64,935,896 68,942,589 4,006,693 6.2%
1996 65,229,250 69,454,968 4,225,718 6.5%
1997 77,376,091 65,921,869 -11,454,222 -14.8%
1998 88,535,510 71,555,502 -16,980,008 -19.2%
1999 66,662,749 78,824,696 12,161,947 18.2%
2000 65,477,288 78,523,705 13,046,417 19.9%
2001 63,693,458 75,536,380 11,842,922 18.6%
2002 77,885,079 68,654,425 -9,230,654 -11.9%
2003 93,690,168 73,313,509 -20,376,659 -21.7%
2004 119,372,689 81,899,599 -37,473,090 -31.4%
2005 89,561,808 100,017,870 10,456,062 11.7%
2006 94,251,405 102,428,837 8,177,432 8.7%
2007 92,709,267 102,724,612 10,015,345 10.8%
2008 93,199,944 93,277,838 77,894 0.1%
2009 97,405,960 95,056,413 -2,349,547 -2.4%











B0–3 = Coefficients, E= Error 
MPC, FC, MC = Manpower, Fuel and Maintenance Costs respectively 
A comparison of the results of the regression model with the actual O&S costs 
recorded over the last 20 years was completed.  Figure 49 and Table 23 show the 
comparison of the two in which the model tended to overestimate costs by an average of 
5.7 percent.  Using this model for future predictions yielded an O&S cost in FY2024 of 
$110.5M per ship which was a 5.7 percent decrease from the FY2010 actual recorded 
cost of $117.2M.  This decrease was assumed to be driven by the over $2M decrease in 
fuel costs during the last two years observed. 
Total AS-39 O&S Cost = b0 + b1MPC + b2FC+ b3MC + E 





Figure 49.   Testing and Projection of AS-39 Regression Model 
 
Table 23.   AS-39 O&S Cost Variances 
24. Spearhead Class High Speed Vessel (JHSV-1) 
No actual historical cost data have been made available yet for the Joint High 
Speed Vessel so a point estimate was used in its place.  The breakdown of O&S costs are 
FY Actual Total Cost Est Total Cost Variance Variance %
1991 84,043,466 85,878,164 1,834,698 2.2%
1992 92,825,765 91,864,470 -961,295 -1.0%
1993 84,134,230 85,187,014 1,052,784 1.3%
1994 95,744,616 87,643,216 -8,101,400 -8.5%
1995 95,123,558 90,477,270 -4,646,288 -4.9%
1996 97,878,205 88,359,592 -9,518,613 -9.7%
1997 95,998,567 93,329,073 -2,669,494 -2.8%
1998 81,811,358 94,587,718 12,776,360 15.6%
1999 105,342,426 94,785,408 -10,557,018 -10.0%
2000 109,826,106 96,799,758 -13,026,348 -11.9%
2001 99,757,916 100,491,692 733,776 0.7%
2002 111,164,145 105,334,783 -5,829,362 -5.2%
2003 112,268,101 106,338,555 -5,929,546 -5.3%
2004 115,258,168 106,727,394 -8,530,774 -7.4%
2005 130,845,752 111,250,297 -19,595,455 -15.0%
2006 121,142,846 117,800,837 -3,342,009 -2.8%
2007 117,533,430 121,554,070 4,020,640 3.4%
2008 101,666,094 122,593,892 20,927,798 20.6%
2009 98,469,511 114,166,343 15,696,832 15.9%





shown in Figure 50 with total O&S costs estimated to be $27.7M per ship according to its 
SAR report.  This was the amount used in FY2024.  Of note, unlike both the DDG-1000 
and the LHA-6 ships, unit operations were expected to drive most costs for this particular 
platform. 
 
Figure 50.   JHSV-1 Costs by Area Based on SAR Report 
25. Surveillance Ship (AGOS-19) 
With a crew size of about 19, one would expect the manning costs on the 
surveillance ships to at least top $1M, yet as Figure 51 shows, manning costs are almost 
nothing.  In fact, the total recorded manning costs have ranged from $21K in FY2000 to 
$41K in FY2010.  That equated to an annual cost/payment of between $1.1K and $1.2K 
per crew member which cannot be accurate.  However, since these were the only data 










B0–2 = Coefficients, E= Error 
EC, MC = Energy (Fuel) and Maintenance Costs respectively 
A comparison of the results of the regression model with the actual O&S costs 
recorded over the last 11 years was completed.  Figure 52 and Table 24 show the 
comparison of the two in which the model tended to underestimate costs by 17.1 percent.  
Using this model for future predictions yielded an O&S cost in FY2024 of $8.3M per 
ship which was a 15 percent decrease from the FY2010 actual recorded cost of $9.8M.  
This decrease was assumed to be driven by the low reporting of manning costs.  If more 
reliable manning figures were used, the estimated costs would rise about $1.5M.38 
                                                 
38 Assuming an average annual salary of $80K for each of the 19 crew members on board. 
Total AGOS-19 O&S Cost = b0 + b1EC + b2MC+ E 





Figure 52.   Testing and Projection of AGOS-19 Regression Model 
 
Table 24.   AGOS-19 O&S Cost Variances 
26. Surveillance Ship (AGOS-23)  
Similar to the AGOS-19 surveillance ships, the AGOS-23 ships have 
demonstrated costs profiles in which manning costs were almost nonexistent shown in 
Figure 53.  Despite this, regression models were used with similar future estimates to that 
of the AGOS-19 platform. 
FY Actual Total Cost Est Total Cost Variance Variance %
2000 5,731,108 6,179,970 448,861 7.8%
2001 6,739,755 6,980,074 240,320 3.6%
2002 6,281,975 6,780,405 498,431 7.9%
2003 5,822,766 6,646,816 824,051 14.2%
2004 4,421,055 6,601,121 2,180,066 49.3%
2005 5,442,495 5,585,715 143,220 2.6%
2006 5,592,983 5,072,058 -520,924 -9.3%
2007 8,346,710 4,916,502 -3,430,208 -41.1%
2008 9,077,969 6,367,131 -2,710,838 -29.9%
2009 6,992,669 7,746,131 753,462 10.8%











B0–2 = Coefficients, E= Error 
EC, MC = Energy (Fuel) and Maintenance Costs respectively 
A comparison of the results of the regression model with the actual O&S costs 
recorded over the last eight years was completed.  Figure 54 and Table 25 show the 
comparisons of the two in which the model tended to underestimate costs by 7.3 percent.  
Using this model for future predictions yielded an O&S cost in FY2024 of $9.5M per 
ship which was a four percent decrease from the FY2010 actual recorded cost of $9.9M.  
This decrease was assumed to be driven by the low reporting of manning costs.  If more 
reliable manning figures were used, the estimated costs would rise about $1.5M.39 
                                                 
39 Assuming an average annual salary of $80K for each of the 19 crew members on board. 
Total AGOS-23 O&S Cost = b0 + b1EC + b2MC+ E 





Figure 54.   Testing and Projection of AGOS-23 Regression Model 
 
Table 25.   AGOS-23 O&S Cost Variances 
27. Salvage Ship (ARS-50)  
Although within its 20s in regards to age, the cost data for the salvage ships 
depicted in Figure 55 were only attainable for the last five years.  In addition, no 
successful regression was able to be calculated so a three-year moving average model 
was used in its place. 
FY Actual Total Cost Est Total Cost Variance Variance %
2003 6,052,143 6,298,910 246,767 4.1%
2004 7,676,781 7,448,016 -228,765 -3.0%
2005 7,694,310 7,741,096 46,786 0.6%
2006 10,112,442 7,162,674 -2,949,768 -29.2%
2007 7,498,142 8,346,488 848,346 11.3%
2008 10,645,428 8,517,089 -2,128,339 -20.0%
2009 8,645,424 9,581,395 935,971 10.8%






Figure 55.   ARS-50 Costs by Top Three Cost Drivers 
A comparison of the results of the averaging model with the actual O&S costs 
recorded over the last five years was completed and Figure 56 and table 26 show the 
comparison of the two.  Using this model for future predictions yielded an O&S cost in 
FY2024 of $10.8M per ship which was a nine percent decrease from the FY2010 actual 
recorded cost of $11.9M.  This decrease was assumed to be driven by the model in which 






Figure 56.   Testing and Projection of ARS-50 Model 
 
Table 26.   ARS-50 O&S Cost Variances 
28. Fleet Ocean Tug (ATF-166) 
Across all three cost areas, the reduction in costs have driven the total O&S costs 
for the fleet ocean tugs downward in an almost linear fashion.  Costs have steadily 
dropped from a recorded high in FY1996 of just over $9M to as low as $5M in FY2007, 
as seen in Figure 57. 
FY Actual Total Cost Est Total Cost Variance Variance %
2006 7,311,035 7,311,035 0 0.0%
2007 10,115,660 10,115,660 0 0.0%
2008 10,205,889 10,205,889 0 0.0%
2009 9,222,023 9,210,861 -11,162 -0.1%






Figure 57.   ATF-166 Costs by Top Three Cost Drivers 
A comparison of the results of the averaging model with the actual O&S costs 
recorded over the last 18 years was completed and Figure 58 and Table 27 show the 
comparison of the two.  Using this model for future predictions yielded an O&S cost in 
FY2024 of $6.5M per ship which was a three percent decrease from the FY2010 actual 
recorded cost of $6.7M.  This decrease was assumed to be driven by the downward 






Figure 58.   Testing and Projection of ATF-166 Model 
 
Table 27.   ATF-166 O&S Cost Variances 
29. Mobile Landing Platform Ship (MLP-1) 
As a future ship for the battle force, the MLP had no acquisition cost data 
detailing what the expected O&S costs would be.  Three ships are scheduled to be 
produced and commissioned into the fleet before FY2024.  The design of the mobile 
FY Actual Total Cost Est Total Cost Variance Variance %
1993 8,051,700 8,051,700 0 0
1994 8,630,616 8,630,616 0 0
1995 7,843,674 7,843,674 0 0
1996 9,318,711 8,175,330 -1,143,381 -0.1226974
1997 7,855,636 8,597,667 742,031 0.0944584
1998 8,327,113 8,339,341 12,227 0.00146837
1999 7,418,904 8,500,487 1,081,583 0.14578739
2000 5,983,911 7,867,218 1,883,307 0.31472843
2001 6,005,605 7,243,310 1,237,705 0.20609156
2002 7,315,280 6,469,473 -845,806 -0.1156219
2003 6,790,700 6,434,932 -355,768 -0.0523905
2004 5,133,827 6,703,862 1,570,035 0.30582161
2005 6,327,351 6,413,269 85,918 0.01357887
2006 6,095,315 6,083,959 -11,356 -0.0018631
2007 5,107,410 5,852,164 744,754 0.14581829
2008 5,907,001 5,843,359 -63,642 -0.010774
2009 6,510,944 5,703,242 -807,702 -0.1240529





landing platforms is expected to be based on the Alaska class oil tanker, which is a part of 
the VLCC (super tanker) category of crude oil ships.40  According to Frontline Ltd, the 
biggest operator of VLCC’s, it required $32.9K a day or $12M annually to simply break 
even when operating one its VLCC ships.  Using this figure as an expert/analogous 
estimate for the new MLP’s, the expected cost of each MLP-1 class ship in FY2024 was 
also $12M.    
 
                                                 




V. DATA ANALYSIS – AFFORDABILITY 
The bottom line up front is that the Navy cannot afford a 324 ship battle force in 
FY2024 without seriously altering the way it does business.  The reasoning behind this 
conclusion is described in the subsequent sections of this chapter. 
A. FACTORS AFFECTING AFFORDABILTY 
1. Battle Force Cost Models  
From the cost models produced in Chapter IV, the total O&S costs for the entire 
324 ship battle force in FY2024 was estimated to be just under $20B.  As shown in 
Figure 59, this is a 17 percent increase from the FY2010 288 ship battle force costs of 
$17B.41  Note: An increase from 288 to 324 ships is 12.5 percent in fleet size, 
whereas the cost for this increase is 17 percent.     
 
Figure 59.   Total Battle Force O&S Costs 
This $3B FY2010 constant dollars growth to the battle force budget is believed to 
be an understatement of the true costs for three reasons.  First, from the cost variance 
tables provided throughout Chapter IV, the cost models for 18 out of the 29 classes of 
ships resulted in the tendency to underestimate the costs of each ship within its particular 
                                                 




class.  That is to say, 62 percent of the cost estimate models that were used tended to 
yield costs that were on average slightly lower than the true costs observed.42  It is 
therefore believed that the $20B cost estimate in FY2024 is most likely an 
underestimation as well.  With that said, the scale of cost variances when viewed from an 
entire battle force cost viewpoint is a matter of tens of millions of dollars which can be 
assumed to be a moot point when viewing costs in the billions. 
Second, the FY2024 cost estimate is believed to be an understatement due to the 
point listed under the assumptions section of Chapter III in which costs associated with 
embarked squadrons were not incorporated into the costs analysis for the various aircraft 
carrier and amphibious ships under review.  Since an aircraft carrier’s crew size for 
example, can essentially double while on deployments, manpower costs were understated 
in the O&S costs listed within the VAMOSC database and therefore in this thesis.  This 
same logic can be applied for aircraft fuel and maintenance costs within these classes of 
ship.  As a result, it was believed that true O&S costs were at least one to two billion 
dollars higher than estimated in this thesis.  However, this factor was already taken into 
consideration and assumption noted when measuring the historical costs of the FY2010 
battle force and creating the models and FY2010/FY2024 comparisons for all classes of 
ship. 
Third, through yet another point listed under the assumptions section of Chapter 
III, manpower costs for submarines, Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) and Joint High Speed 
Vessels (JHSV) were all understated since they did not capture the other part of the crew 
in the Blue-Gold crew composition.  For instance, with a reported onboard crew size of 
42, a JHSV’s manning costs were on average $4M according to its SAR estimate.  Since 
these ships used a Blue-Gold rotational crew, the true size of the JHSV crew should 
instead be 84 personnel, one team of 42 actually on board and one team ashore.  With 21 
JHSV’s expected to be a part of the battle force in FY2024, $84M of additional manning 
costs were neglected from the estimate for this class of ship alone.  Add the same 
                                                 
42 This does not include the assumption that point estimates would mostly likely yield underestimates 




reasoning for the LCS and that would be another $90M, equating to a total of $174M in 
underestimation for these two class platforms to the overall battle force costs. 
2. Battle Force Mix 
By far the largest component to determining affordability of the FY2024 battle 
force would be through the determination of the exact mix of ships in that force.  As it 
stood during this analysis, the battle force mix illustrated earlier in Table 3 of Chapter IV 
shows the breakdown of the 324 ships expected by the Navy; the estimated costs of 
which was $20B from the cost models.  This mix of ships could be extremely volatile 
since delays in procurements or deliveries of one ship, extensions of others, or simply the 
rearrangement of classification of ships within the battle force can all greatly impact the 
cost structure involved.  This therefore creates an opportunity for the future cost estimate 
made in this thesis and future estimates made by others to be very sensitive to change.   
As mentioned previously, the increase in O&S costs from FY2010 to FY2024 is 
expected to be 17 percent.  Simply adding one aircraft carrier to the 11 already in the fleet 
would add between $392M–$475M or three percent to the total cost growth, depending 
on the type of carrier and when it was added.  In fact, despite force levels being less than 
324 in earlier years such as in FY2022, there is the expectation of having 12 aircraft 
carriers in the fleet at that time potentially making the overall battle force more 
expensive.  Making other subtle adjustments such as increasing the Guided Missile 
Cruisers by two and reducing the Joint High Speed Vessel by two would increase total 
costs in FY2024 by another one percent.  The variations of ship mix are seemingly 
endless and therefore can alter a cost estimate dramatically.  Refer to Table 5 in Chapter 
IV for the breakdown in annual ship costs to further illustrate the sensitivity that a 
particular battle force mix might have on O&S costs. 
3. Navy O&S Budget 
Since Operating and Support costs were associated with both the Military 
Personnel and Operation and Maintenance Navy budget accounts, both the MPN and 




(FY1998–2010) were utilized to forecast what the future budgets would perhaps look like 
from FY2011–2024.   
 
Figure 60.   MPN and OMN Budget Growth Trends (From: 43) 
When reviewing the growth percentages from FY1998–2010, there was an actual 
growth of 31.2 percent within the OMN budget and a 22 percent growth in the total 
OMN/MPN combined total budget.  Using linear trend line forecasting for the future, the 
OMN budget appeared to grow at 31.7 percent and the combined total budget by 27.2 
percent leading into FY2024.44  In another words, the OMN and combined MPN and 
OMN budgets had grown at fairly similar rates which is indicative of linear trend line 
forecasting.   
This forecast was interesting because while the budgets grew at these rates from 
FY1998 to 2010, the size of the Navy’s battle force had shrunk by 13.5 percent from 333 
to 288 ships during this same time.  See Figure 61.  Yet, although the budgetary growth 
rates were expected to continue at similar rates into the future, the battle force size is no 
longer shrinking but instead now growing by 12.5 percent or 36 ships.   
                                                 
43 Cost data from 1998–2010 are actual costs recorded in Military Personnel Navy and Operation and 
Maintenance Navy annual budget reports which were provided on Department of Navy Financial Manager 
and Comptroller website.  http://www.finance.hq.navy.mil/fmb/12pres/BOOKS.htm 





Figure 61.   Ship Count vs. Budget Trend Relationship 
This reversal in relationship between ship count and budget allocation from past 
to future causes a very obvious dilemma.  The amount of money allocated specifically for 
each ship’s personnel, fuel and maintenance costs is subsequently forced to change as 
more ships are now added instead of being removed from the fleet.  More funding will be 
required to be shifted away from other activities that may have grown expectant of those 
funds in order to meet the added operating and support costs of this larger fleet.   
Since funding has already been extremely tight over the years resulting in 
difficulties in meeting operating and support costs, so much so that the Navy “remains 
dependent upon the receipt of OCO or similar supplemental appropriations to fund ship 
maintenance requirements,” adding more ships in the future while funding growth levels 
remain similar does not seem to pass the “logic test”.45  This is of course assuming the 
very-likely defense budgetary cuts ranging in the hundreds of billions of dollars over the 
next ten years do not occur, which is certainly not a logical assumption to make.  
Additionally, about 70 percent of the ships that are expected to be in service in 
FY2020 are made up of ships currently in commission.46  This means that a majority of 
the ships that will make up the battle force in the early 2020s will be older ships, resulting 
in possibly higher maintenance costs incurred and therefore higher funding levels 
                                                 
45 Quote extracted from statement provided to House Armed Service Readiness Committee on Navy 
Readiness given by Vice Admiral William Burke (Deputy Chief of Naval Operations Fleet Readiness & 
Logistics) and Vice Admiral Kevin McCoy (Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command) on 12July2011.  
OCO funds are additional funds requested by the military for  Overseas Contingency Operations 
(OCO).which are separate from the funds requested in the President’s budget each year.  
46 Source:  Statement provided to House Armed Service Readiness Committee on Navy Readiness 
given by Vice Admiral William Burke (Deputy Chief of Naval Operations Fleet Readiness & Logistics) 




required.  Ships such as the Command Ship (LCC) will have been extended past their 
original service life expectancies and others such as the Guided Missile Cruiser (CG) will 
have just began to reach their life expectancies.  Since “we continue to see shortfalls 
throughout the fleet including…fewer spare parts available and more than $815 million 
of unfunded maintenance requirements,” a combination of an aging and enlarged fleet, 
even for just a few years, can be problematic in terms of affordability.47 
4. Navy Cost Reduction Initiatives 
In terms of how the Navy plans to counter this affordability dilemma, scores of 
possible scenarios have been considered and most seem to center on the manning and fuel 
cost reduction initiatives.  In fact, when asked during a visit to the Naval Postgraduate 
School, the Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus responded with a strategy of using a series 
of cost reduction initiatives that addressed all three cost factors (manning, fuel and 
maintenance) reviewed in this thesis.  The ones of interest which he alluded to were: 1) 
reduced manning on the new Ford Class aircraft carriers, Littoral Combat Ships, and 
Joint High Speed Vessels would all help lower the manning costs and address 
affordability issues while also “moving people from desk jobs to either the pier or on the 
ship…” to help aid in the process; and 2) energy initiatives such as the installation of 
Hybrid Electric Drives (HED) on all Guided Missile Destroyers that would help with fuel 
costs.48 
a. Manning Initiatives 
In terms of all the data reviewed and produced from the VAMOSC 
database, SAR cost reports, and the FY2024 cost estimates calculated in this thesis, the 
reduced manning on all three of the ships mentioned above does almost nothing with 
regards to cost savings for the Navy.  As mentioned in the Ford aircraft carrier section of 
Chapter IV, although it is true that reduced manning onboard the new Ford aircraft 
                                                 
47 Comment made by Virginia Congressional Representative Randy Forbes on 12July2011. 
48 Quote:  SECNAV Mabus during Secretary of the Navy Guest Lecture (SGL) at the Naval 




carriers are expected to be less than the current Nimitz class ships, other costs such as 
increased maintenance costs would ultimately cause O&S costs to be very similar to the 
older Nimitz class ships in the end.49   
As far as the Littoral Combat Ship goes, it was intended to completely 
replace the Guided Missile Frigates by the end of FY2020; yet actual O&S costs recorded 
by the Navy in VAMOSC have shown that the LCS has been more expensive so far than 
the FFG’s.  The O&S costs on a FFG in FY2010 were $29.2M with an average over the 
last 20 years of $27.8M, whereas the O&S costs for a LCS were 25 percent higher or 
$36.4M; and this amount did not include the additional manning costs associated with the 
other part of the LCS’ Blue-Gold crew mentioned earlier.   
With regards to the Joint High Speed Vessel, this ship was not officially 
planned to replace any others in the Navy’s current battle force structure.  Even with a 
smaller crew size, the average O&S costs for just one ship were expected to be $27.6M 
which is actually more than a FFG when including the additional $4M for the rest of the 
Blue-Gold crew that is associated with the ship.  With about 21 of these ships expected in 
FY2024, that’s an added $660M to the Navy’s budget for a new class of ship that is 
replacing no others. 
Finally, in addressing the idea of shifting personnel from shore commands 
to either the pier or to the new ships in order to offset the need to recruit more personnel, 
the effect is minimal.  Again, the cost difference from a 288 ship to a 324 ship battle 
force Navy is at a minimum $3B according to this thesis’ estimates.  Assuming that, on 
average, a sailor cost $80K each, then approximately 37.5K personnel would be required 
to shift from shore to sea to make up for that $3B difference—a very unlikely, if not 
impossible, feat. 
                                                 
49 This is again only when compared in FY2010.  Since a point estimate was used for CVN-78, no 
price growth was included and therefore became increasingly different than that of CVN-68 leading into 




 b. Hybrid Electric Drive (HED) Initiative 
Before reviewing the potential cost savings and effects on affordability 
that the Hybrid Electric Drives (HED) would provide the Navy, it is worth looking at the 
fuel costs (prior-to-HED-technology) that were incurred over the last 20 years by the 
major combatant ships that comprise the current FY2010 battle force.  Referring to 
Figure 62, fuel cost data derived from VAMOSC were broken down to their simplest 
form, cost per gallon of fuel.  Focusing on the darker line labeled “Average,” it is safe to 
say that costs per gallon for the major combatant ships in the battle force remained rather 
steady, costing an average of $2.2–$2.7 per gallon over the last two decades for the nine 
ships reviewed here.  This is extremely interesting since the whole push for HED was due 
to concerns over rising fuel prices over the years.  The data here simply do not support 
that concern.50 
 
Figure 62.   Cost Per Gallon of Fuel for Combatant Ships 
With regards to the potential cost savings to the total battle force for the 
inclusion of a Hybrid Electric Drive on Guided Missile Destroyers, the savings is 
minimal when compared to the $3B increase in total costs in FY2024 for the 36 added 
                                                 
50 Although there is a fairly obvious upward trend in price per gallon from $2.2 to  $2.7, this 22.7 
percent price growth was  over a 20 year span.  Assuming the same growth rate in the next 20 years, the 





ships expected.  According to a DRS Technologies technical report, “assuming a 12-knot 
system and the operating profile used in this study, fuel savings are estimated at 4800 
barrels per ship per year for the motoring-only case and 8900 barrels per ship per year for 
the motoring-generating case.”51  This equates to approximately 373.8K gallons of fuel 
per ship or 29.9M gallons for all 80 DDG’s in FY2024, assuming all 80 ships have the 
technology at that time.  Further assuming a cost per fuel gallon of $3 which is higher 
than the historical 20 year average to date, the savings to the fleet would be on the high 
end of $90M in FY2024.  With total O&S costs for that year expected to be at least $20B, 
this is less than half of one percent savings, although a large number by itself, would not 
be large enough to make any difference in the larger scheme of O&S costs.        
B. AFFORDABILITY CONCLUSION 
“During inspections in the last two years, more than 1 in 5 Navy vessels were 
deemed less than satisfactory or unfit for combat.”52  If the Navy is already struggling to 
meet funding requirements to properly man, fuel and maintain a fleet of 288 ships in 
FY2010, the prospect of somehow reversing that trend for an even larger fleet of 324 
ships in FY2024 when budgets are more likely to be greatly cut, does not seem to hold 
much merit.  Even with the cost reduction initiatives in the works and more on the way 
within the lifelines of the Navy, they are simply not enough to counter the added costs 
that the additional 36 ships in the battle force will create. 
                                                 
51  Source:  Economic Benefits of Hybrid Drive Propulsion for Naval Ships.    
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=04906560 









A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
• Referring back to Table 4, the following cost estimation models were derived 
through analysis of  the three largest cost areas (manning, fuel and maintenance) 
for each class of ship:53 
o Estimation models used for total O&S costs within a class of ship: 
 17 regression estimation models 
 Five point estimation models 
 Five 3-year moving average estimation models  
 Two export or analogous estimation models 
o Estimation models used for total manning costs within a class of ship: 
 10 regression estimation models 
 Six 3-year moving average estimation models 
o Estimation models used for total fuel costs within a class of ship: 
 Four regression estimation models 
 Six 3-year moving average estimation models 
o Estimation models used for total maintenance costs within a class of 
ship: 
 15 3-year moving average cost estimation models 
• No regression models were attainable in measuring maintenance costs for any of 
the classes of ships reviewed. 
• 18 out of the 29 “total O&S cost” estimation models tended on average to yield 
lower cost estimations when compared to actual costs recorded in VAMOSC. 
• In terms of cost volatility, more often than not, fuel costs were the most stable 
followed by manning costs and then maintenance costs.  By far, maintenance 
costs were the most volatile cost factor in O&S costs on average. 
                                                 
53 Although there were 29 cost estimation models, not all of them utilized manpower, fuel or 
maintenance as a variable within their regression equations.  In other cases, 3-year moving averages or 




• O&S costs were quite sensitive to the particular mix of ships within the battle 
force during any given year.  A higher number of ships in the battle force in a 
later year did not necessary indicate higher expected O&S costs.  Instead, it 
depended on the particular mix of ships within that battle force. 
• A 324 ship Navy was estimated to raise O&S costs by a minimum of 17 percent 
in FY2024 (constant FY2010 dollars) from the costs recorded for a 288 ship battle 
force in FY2010.   
• Reduced manning as a cost reduction initiative for the new Ford class aircraft 
carrier (CVN-78) and Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) provide almost negligible 
savings to the Navy since higher maintenance and other costs make up for the 
difference.  In fact, the new CVN-78 aircraft carriers are expected to have similar 
O&S costs to the older CVN-68 class aircraft carriers.  The LCS and Joint High 
Speed Vessels have already proven to cost more than the Guided Missile Frigate 
of which the LCS was designed to replace.   
• Hybrid Electric Drives (HED) as a cost reduction initiative is expected to provide 
less than one percent in overall O&S cost savings which is negligible when 
increased O&S costs from the additional 36 ships added to the fleet are incurred.  
B. CONCLUSION 
Assuming the Navy OMN and MPN budgets continue their historical growth 
trends into FY2024, essentially escaping any budgetary reductions until then, the Navy 
will still not be able to afford to properly operate and maintain a battle force fleet of 324 
ships.  As Congressman Forbes has publicly stated, “our Navy already has insufficient 
resources to preserve its current fleet...”54  With a minimum O&S cost growth of 17 
percent by adding these 36 extra ships to the battle force, the Navy would be forced to 
provide more funding despite less funding available which would amplify the already 
existent problem of underfunding and scarcity within the fleet as it is.   
 
                                                 





C. RECOMMENDATIONS  
Rather than “kicking the can down the road” with regards to determining how to 
possibly afford a 12.5 percent growth to the Navy’s battle force sometime in the future, 
probably when it is too late, the Navy should realistically plan for it now.  The framework 
for including O&S costs and affordability is already in place since feasibility and 
affordability analysis for both R&D and procurement are currently completed in these 
annual shipbuilding plans.  Use of cost estimation models such as the ones in this thesis 
would allow for simple inclusion of O&S cost analysis in these reports as well.  
Therefore, it is recommended that the Navy include within its shipbuilding plan to 
congress the expected O&S costs and affordability analysis of the future battle force each 
year in order to fully understand the magnitude and feasibility of what is being proposed. 
D. AREAS FOR FUTURE STUDY 
• Capture the full O&S costs associated with embarked squadrons aboard certain 
classes of ships such as aircraft carriers and amphibious ships. 
• Capture full manpower costs (Blue-Gold teams) for submarines, Littoral Combat 
Ships (LCS) and Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSV) since they were not fully 
recorded in the cost data reviewed. 
• Analyze the affordability aspect of an enlarged future battle force after the Navy 
begins facing the large budgetary cuts that are currently being proposed and 
introduced to the Defense Department. 
• Attempt to successfully derive regression models for maintenance costs 
associated with each ship class instead of having to resort to 3-year moving 
average models. 
• Update the cost estimation models, especially where point estimates or 3-year 
moving averages were used because of little or no actual historical cost data 




















APPENDIX B –CORRELATION TESTS OF VARIABLES 
 
Table 29.   CVN-68 Correlation Matrix of Regression Variables 
 
Table 30.   CG-47 Correlation Matrix of Regression Variables 
 
Table 31.   DDG-51 Correlation Matrix of Regression Variables 
 
Table 32.   SSN-21 Correlation Matrix of Regression Variables 
Manning Cost Total Maintenance FY Manning #
Manning Cost 1
Total Maintenance 0.661377933 1
FY 0.935356813 0.572700212 1
Manning # 0.418674603 0.552946202 0.17471 1
CVN-68 Correlation Matrix
Manning Cost Fuel Cost Total Maintenance Manning # FY $/Gal u/w hrs
Manning Cost 1
Fuel Cost 0.073463651 1
Total Maintenance 0.644024754 0.1010858 1
Manning # -0.212772869 0.1542635 -0.589681995 1
FY 0.9079342 -0.0687042 0.798601846 -0.51437 1
$/Gal 0.285626857 0.6461404 0.409799031 -0.4231297 0.4028245 1
u/w hrs -0.082486012 0.6613325 -0.039035827 0.4588999 -0.311235 -0.03658 1
CG-47 Correlation Matrix
Manning Cost Fuel Cost Total Maintenance Manning # FY $/Gal U/W hrs
Manning Cost 1
Fuel Cost -0.070143851 1
Total Maintenance 0.714816273 -0.338836 1
Manning # -0.10503778 -0.073849 -0.235126011 1
FY 0.887385999 -0.017565 0.767022857 -0.4770975 1
$/Gal -0.090999848 0.7322693 -0.265602904 -0.0634353 -0.10794 1
U/W hrs 0.127347912 0.3218652 0.016021453 -0.0954313 0.277821 -0.366466 1
DDG-51 Correlation Matrix 
Manning Cost Total Maintenance FY Manning #
Manning Cost 1
Total Maintenance 0.722478239 1
FY 0.784594604 0.907401277 1






Table 33.   SSN-688 Correlation Matrix of Regression Variables 
 
Table 34.   SSN-774 Correlation Matrix of Regression Variables 
 
Table 35.   SSGN-726 Correlation matrix of Regression Variables 
 
Table 36.   LHD-1 Correlation Matrix of Regression Variables 
 
Manning Cost Total Maintenance FY Manning #
Manning Cost 1
Total Maintenance 0.425316672 1
FY 0.918218189 0.139568378 1
Manning # 0.673173718 0.880712218 0.408933 1
SSN-688 Correlation Matrix
Manning Cost Total Maintenance FY Manning #
Manning Cost 1
Total Maintenance 0.299698417 1
FY -0.254843392 0.812559251 1
Manning # 0.596800688 -0.339173128 -0.81009 1
SSN-774 Correlation Matrix
Manning Cost Total Maintenance FY Manning #
Manning Cost 1
Total Maintenance -0.528561575 1
FY 0.913152424 -0.156457646 1
Manning # 0.99352149 -0.587340609 0.878748 1
SSGN-726 Correlation  Matrix
Manning Cost Fuel Cost Total Maintenance FY Manning # $/Gal U/W Hrs
Manning Cost 1
Fuel Cost 0.673569143 1
Total Maintenance 0.308327136 0.2160222 1
FY 0.930997805 0.578608 0.405884815 1
Manning # 0.278135078 0.3670073 0.134798387 0.268328 1
$/Gal 0.552114651 0.6230138 0.2776918 0.541452 -0.007041 1






Table 37.   LSD-41 Correlation Matrix of Regression Variables 
 
Table 38.    LSD-49 Correlation Matrix of Regression Variables 
 
Table 39.   MCM-1 Correlation Matrix of Regression Variables 
 
Table 40.   AO-187 Correlation Matrix of Regression Variables 
 
Manning Cost Total Maintenance Fuel Cost FY Manning # $/Gal U/W Hrs
Manning Cost 1
Total Maintenance 0.540199776 1
Fuel Cost 0.398276809 0.108031059 1
FY 0.914665575 0.756072394 0.2120861 1
Manning # 0.529616161 -0.071726362 0.5264097 0.241222 1
$/Gal 0.50883357 0.559494243 0.5983068 0.540233 0.251987345 1
U/W Hrs 0.269872062 -0.073555766 0.7631417 0.065538 0.514308662 0.069421 1
LSD-41 Correlation Matrix
Manning Cost Fuel Cost Total Maintenance FY Manning # $/Gal U/W Hrs
Manning Cost 1
Fuel Cost 0.803916967 1
Total Maintenance 0.497757091 0.491098 1
FY 0.749361588 0.744357 0.7423435 1
Manning # 0.294626049 0.002694 -0.102746657 -0.1082 1
$/Gal 0.039630737 0.26768 0.072340078 0.161824 -0.1687675 1
U/W Hrs 0.689442494 0.814619 0.543032775 0.704166 0.09461439 -0.258327 1
LSD-49 Correlation Matrix
Manning Cost Fuel Cost Total Maintenance FY Manning # $/Gal U/W Hrs
Manning Cost 1
Fuel Cost -0.328959528 1
Total Maintenance 0.164993474 -0.309716 1
FY 0.928664888 -0.398555 0.175187313 1
Manning # 0.176091749 0.002029 -0.112514863 -0.05055 1
$/Gal 0.00615627 0.003894 -0.263396741 0.107627 -0.2433948 1
U/W Hrs 0.053952559 0.75916 -0.10094955 -0.03927 0.12853285 -0.49383 1
MCM-1 Correlation Matrix
Manning Cost Energy Cost Maintenance Cost
Manning Cost 1
Energy Cost -0.392687912 1






Table 41.   AOE-6 Correlation Matrix of Regression Variables 
 
Table 42.   LCC-19 Correlation Matrix of Regression Variables 
 
Table 43.   AS-39 Correlation Matrix of Regression Variables 
 
Table 44.   AGOS-19 Correlation Matrix of Regression Variables 
 
Manpower Cost Energy Cost Maintenance Cost FY S/Gal Hrs U/W
Manpower Cost 1
Energy Cost 0.958188679 1
Maintenance Cost -0.09077045 0.026167841 1
FY 0.827401477 0.70568527 -0.397719017 1
S/Gal 0.528032912 0.579793822 -0.135336486 0.555154 1
Hrs U/W 0.97942815 0.94295564 -0.068784285 0.817797 0.414636 1
AOE-6 Correlation Matrix
Manning Cost Fuel Cost Total Maintenance FY Manning # $/Gal U/W Hrs
Manning Cost 1
Fuel Cost 0.542925684 1
Total Maintenance 0.282057292 -0.14182875 1
FY 0.908681782 0.420526049 0.365782776 1
Manning # -0.371718311 -0.08610987 -0.441255433 -0.68561 1
$/Gal 0.510501792 0.539612385 0.395533507 0.455662 -0.11559353 1
U/W Hrs 0.137803618 0.585291968 -0.293539555 0.01429 0.088210782 -0.23872 1
LCC-19 Correlation Matrix
Manning Cost Fuel Cost Total Maintenance
Manning Cost 1
Fuel Cost 0.389640437 1
Total Maintenance 0.119236677 -0.0326936 1
AS-39 Correlation Matrix
Manning Cost Energy Cost Maintenance Cost
Manning Cost 1
Energy Cost -0.123420505 1






Table 45.   AGOS-23 Correlation Matrix of Regression Variables 
  
Manning Cost Energy Cost Maintenance Cost
Manning Cost 1
Energy Cost -0.595708545 1









APPENDIX C – REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
Table 46.   CVN-68 Compiled Regression Results 
 
Table 47.   CG-47 Compiled Regression Results 
 
Table 48.   DDG-51 Compiled Regression Results 
 
Table 49.   SSN-21 Compiled Regression Results 
 
Table 50.   SSN-688 Compiled Regression Results 
F-significance Adjusted R^2 b0 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5
CVN-68 9.39277E-27 0.999031097 18841399.38 0.9997 1.01
Man Pwr 3.03901E-11 0.935288857 -10,572,406,323.83 5293066.75 52603.22
Fuel - -
Maintenance - -
F-significance Adjusted R^2 b0 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7 b8 b9
CG-47 1.18014E-12 0.966973585 5813525.06 0.779815418 1.44 0.98
Man Pwr 4.90981E-10 0.910229053 -1422266307 709175.68 71664.18
Fuel 8.73085E-09 0.874051294 -8613812.73 3475709.52 3401.53
Maintenance 5.24254E-05 0.649473059
F-significance Adjusted R^2 b0 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7 b8 b9
DDG-51 1.14088E-13 0.980689666 9203461.42 0.858886666 0.69 0.95
Man Pwr 1.91752E-09 0.908484419 -1331484798 664919.07 65851.15
Fuel 2.01601E-10 0.930941969 -5447759.13 2718757.64 2463.54
Maintenance 0.000348141 0.584211993
F-significance Adjusted R^2 b0 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6
SSN-21 9.21491E-13 0.995300199 -4621230.48 1.571061889 0.98
Man Pwr 2.75404E-07 0.962281385 -137057611.2 454775.58 32018.19 68305.61
Fuel - -
Maintenance - -
F-significance Adjusted R^2 b0 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5
SSN-688 1.16712E-09 0.900602094 -2206322.74 1.18 1.06







Table 51.   SSN-774 Compiled Regression Results 
 
Table 52.   SSGN-726 Compiled Regression Results 
 
Table 53.   LHD-1 Compiled Regression Results 
 
Table 54.   LSD-41 Compiled Regression Results.   
 
Table 55.   LSD-49 Compiled Regression Results 
F-significance Adjusted R^2 b0 b1
SSN-774 0.002858715 0.952785566 13916711.61 0.96
Man Pwr - -
Fuel - -
Maintenance - -
F-significance Adjusted R^2 b0 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5
SSGN-726 6.50237E-09 0.99925637 12565226.19 0.63 0.96
Man Pwr 2.62558E-06 0.991799921 -540928170.8 270820.41 74896.64
Fuel - -
Maintenance - -
F-significance Adjusted R^2 b0 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7 b8 b9
LHD-1 4.65257E-23 0.998349234 7359172.09 0.98 1.07 1.02
Man Pwr 2.37596E-11 0.937135796 -4863077561 2426535.12 73085.94
Fuel 3.58073E-08 0.851303305 -12190999.05 6719209.74 4053.76
Maintenance - -
F-significance Adjusted R^2 b0 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5
LSD-41 3.05767E-14 0.971269012 2298033.5 1.323994249 0.95
Man Pwr 5.45196E-11 0.93068292 -1049804083 525555.94 54177.53
Fuel N/A N/A
Maintenance N/A N/A
F-significance Adjusted R^2 b0 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6
LSD-49 3.54731E-09 0.969292365 8090823.15 0.68 0.8 1.15
Man Pwr 0.000667583 0.655096416






Table 56.   MCM-1 Compiled Regression Results 
 
Table 57.   AO-187 Compiled Regression Results 
 
Table 58.   AOE-6 Compiled Regression Results 
 
Table 59.   LCC-19 Compiled Regression Results 
 
Table 60.   AS-39 Compiled Regression Results 
F-significance Adjusted R^2 b0 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5
MCM-1 3.22143E-12 0.950305265 414002.04 1.14 0.95
Man Pwr 1.03734E-09 0.901971039 -434391391.5 218602.33 32673.23
Fuel - -
Maintenance - -
F-significance Adjusted R^2 b0 b1 b2 b3
AO-187 4.48986E-08 0.963783074 -58723.93 1.08 1.07 1.24
Man Pwr - -
Energy - -
Maintenance - -
F-significance Adjusted R^2 b0 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6
AOE-6 1.72236E-08 0.997015133 4521491.55 1.05 0.64 1.14
Man Pwr 0.006665132 0.692832297
Energy 8.10857E-05 0.912849195 -9349462.52 3473551.81 4340.91
Maintenance - -
F-significance Adjusted R^2 b0 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6
LCC-19 7.46559E-23 0.998248707 8301876.2 0.92 1.15 0.98
Man Pwr 2.00874E-11 0.938365341 -2779652265 1395024.66 44651.23
Fuel 2.60724E-07 0.812181755
Maintenance - -
F-significance Adjusted R^2 b0 b1 b2 b3
AS-39 6.62141E-11 0.945305486 17571905.32 0.93 1.31 0.82







Table 61.   AGOS-19 Compiled Regression Results 
 
Table 62.   AGOS-23 Compiled Regression Results 
F-significance Adjusted R^2 b0 b1 b2
AGOS-19 2.14149E-05 0.914966694 -1230125 2.64 1.15
Man Pwr - -
Energy - -
Maintenance - -
F-significance Adjusted R^2 b0 b1 b2
AGOS-23 0.00042793 0.937096188 387549.87 1.44 1.06
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